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2016
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216
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English
Ebooks
2016
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Publié par
Date de parution
17 mars 2016
Nombre de lectures
2
EAN13
9781845409029
Langue
English
Poids de l'ouvrage
1 Mo
Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay 'Modern Moral Philosophy' contributed to the transformation of the subject from the late 1960s, reversing the trend to assume that there is no intrinsic connection between facts, values, and reasons for action; and directing attention towards the category of virtues. Her later ethical writings were focused on particular ideas and issues such as those of conscience, double-effect, murder, and sexual ethics. In this collection of new essays deriving from a conference held in Oxford these and other aspects of her moral philosophy are examined. Anyone interested in Anscombe's work all want to read this volume.
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Publié par
Date de parution
17 mars 2016
Nombre de lectures
2
EAN13
9781845409029
Langue
English
Poids de l'ouvrage
1 Mo
Title Page
The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe
Edited by Luke Gormally, David Albert Jones and Roger Teichmann
Publisher Information
PudlisheD in 201g dy Imprint Academic PO Box 200, Exeter EX5 5YX, UA imprint-acaDemic.com
iGital eDition converteD anD DistriduteD dy Andrews UK Limited www.anDrewsuk.com
CopyriGht © 201g Luke ormally, aviD Āldert Jones anD RoGer Teichmann
InDiviDual contridutions © 201g the respective auth ors
The moral riGhts of the authors have deen asserteD. No part of this pudlication may de reproDuceD in any form without permission, except for the quotation of drief passaGes in criticism anD Discussion.
Cover PhotoGraph: St Salvator’s QuaDranGle, St ĀnDrews dy Peter ĀDamson from the University of St ĀnDrews collection
Other Books in this Series
ST ANDREWS STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Founding and General Editor: John Haldane, University of St Andrews
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Philosophy and its Public Role edited by William Aiken and John Haldane
Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism by Graham Long
Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Ans combe edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally
The Institution of Intellectual Values: Realism and Idealism in Higher Education by Gordon Graham
Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Utility by Anthony Kenny and Charles Kenny
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Liberalism, Education and Schooling: Essays by T.M. Mclaughlin edited by David Carr, Mark Halstead and Richard Pring
The Landscape of Humanity: Art, Culture & Society by Anthony O’Hear
Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, Philoso phy and Ethics by G.E.M. Anscombe edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally
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Understanding Faith: Religious Belief and Its Place in Society by Stephen R.L. Clark
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Practical Philosophy: Ethics, Society and Culture by John Haldane
Sensibility and Sense: Aesthetic Transformation of the World by Arnold Berleant
Understanding Teaching and Learning: Classic Texts on Education edited by T. Brian Mooney and Mark Nowacki
Truth and Faith in Ethics edited by Hayden Ramsay
From Plato to Wittgenstein: Essays by G.E.M. Anscom be edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally
Natural Law, Economics, and the Common Good: Perspe ctives from Natural Law edited by Samual Gregg and Harold James
The Philosophy of Punishment by Anthony Ellis
Social Radicalism and Liberal Education
by Lindsay Paterson
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The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe edited by Luke Gormally, David Albert Jones and Rog er Teichmann
Preface
John Haldane
Ey’, published in 1958, is in somelizabeth Anscombe’s article ‘Modern Moral Philosoph respects a characteristic piece of work. It approac hes its topic afresh, argues from first to last, introduces many striking ideas (some as as ides), but is more concerned to identify fallacies and confusions and refute prevai ling dogmas than it is to set out a theory of its own. It is unlike much of her work, h owever, in having a broadly narrative structure, and offering something of a historical s urvey. These two features may be attributable to the circumstances that led to its b eing composed: reading in short order a great many writings in moral philosophy for the p urpose of tutoring in the subject, and undertaking to give a non-specialist talk on the th eme of the title. Like much of Anscombe’s work its freshness endures; but it also seems to have something of a prophetic character. The latter impression is due in large part to the fact that it gave rise to future developments in British , and later American, moral philosophy, so that looking back at it later it appeared to ant icipate them. The main developments came in two phases: first, stalling and then revers ing the trend to assume that there is no intrinsic connection between facts, values and p ractical directives; second, directing attention towards the category of virtues in attemp ting to say how one ought to act. Although the second is now the more prominent assoc iation, it is the first that she was herself more concerned with. If Anscombe had written nothing else on ethics she would still have been known for ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’; and indeed many who know of it may have read little else by her on moral themes. Such is the unsystematic ch aracter of her writings that it is not obvious at first or second pass what the connection s may be between her investigations of intention, promising, authority, killing and other topics. There is also the fact that much of what she wrote on first-order topics, or ethical questions, appeared in publications that would not easily come to the attention of academic philosophers; and remained uncollected in her lifetime. Ten years ago St Andrews Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs publishedHuman Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally. A decade later three further volumes of A nscombe’s writings have appeared in the same series. I am very grateful to those edi tors for their work in making this body of material available. It includes a few essays pre viously included in earlier collected papers but which are now set in contexts of other h itherto inaccessible or unpublished associated writings thereby allowing readers to get a broader, deeper and more detailed sense of Anscombe’s thought. Given this background it is very fitting that the v olume immediately succeeding the last of Anscombe’s own writings should be a collect ion of essays exploring aspects of her moral philosophy. Here we see reflections on th emes presented in the 1958 essay, but also on topics from earlier and mostly from lat er writings. As we proceed towards the centenary of her birth in 1919, thanks to Geach and Gormally and to the editors of the present volume and the authors they have collec ted, we are in a better position than ever before to understand Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophy and to evaluate it. As General Editor of the series I am grateful to al l concerned, including Jared Brandt and Graham Horswell who were involved in aspects of the production.
Contributors
John FinnisNotre Dame, andis Biolchini Family Professor of Law, University of Emeritus Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy, Oxford University.
Aevin L. Flannery SJis Professor of Ancient Philosophy, Gregorian Univ ersity, Rome.
Mary Geachis the literary executor of Elizabeth Anscombe, co- editor of four volumes of her papers, and an independent scholar.
David Goodill OPis a lecturer in moral theology, Blackfriars, Oxfo rd.
Luke Gormallythcare Ethics andis Director Emeritus of The Linacre Centre for Heal co-editor of four volumes of Elizabeth Anscombe’s p apers.
Edward Harcourt is a University Lecturer (CUF) and Official Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Keble College, Oxford.
David Ālbert Jonesis the Director of the Anscombe Bioethics Centre, Research Fellow at Blackfriars Hall, Oxford, and Visiting Professor at St Mary’s University, Twickenham.
Ānselm Winfried Müllersor,is Chicago Moral Philosophy Seminar Visiting Profes University of Chicago, and Emeritus Professor of Ph ilosophy, University of Trier.
Matthew B. O’Brienilosophy atin finance and formerly was a lecturer in ph works Rutgers University and a post-doctoral fellow at Villanova University.
Thomas Pinkis Professor of Philosophy, King’s College, London.
Duncan Richteris Professor of Philosophy, Virginia Military Institute.
Roger Teichmannis Lecturer in Philosophy, St Hilda’s College, Oxfo rd.
José M. TorralbaAssociate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute of is Anthropology and Ethics, University of Navarre.
Candace Voglerophy and Professoris David B. and Clara E. Stern Professor of Philos in the College, University of Chicago.
Reference Ābbreviations to Elizabeth Ānscombe’s pub lications
CPP1 -G.E.M. Anscombe,Collected Philosophical Papers, Parmenides to Wittgenstein(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).
Volume 1: From
CPP2- G.E.M. Anscombe,cs andCollected Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Metaphysi the Philosophy of Mind(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).
CPP3 - G.E.M. Anscombe,Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume 3: Ethics, R eligion and Politics(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).
FHG -Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, Philoso phy and Ethics byG.E.M. Anscombe, edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally (Exeter, U K & Charlottesville, VA, USA: Imprint Academic, 2008).
HLAE -Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Ans combe, edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally (Exeter, UK & Charlottesvil le, VA, USA: Imprint Academic, 2005).
I- G.E.M. Anscombe,Intention, second edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963).
PtW-From Plato to Wittgenstein: Essays by G.E.M. Anscom be, edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally (Exeter, UK & Charlottesville, VA, USA: Imprint Academic, 2011).
In chapters of this volume the initial reference to a paper by Elizabeth Anscombe gives its location in one or other collection of her pape rs in the abbreviated format indicated above.
David Albert Jones
Introduction
This collection had as its origin a conference held in September 2013 at St Hugh’s College in Oxford, where Elizabeth Anscombe had bee n an undergraduate seventy five years previously. The centrepiece of the conference was the Anscombe Memorial Lecture given that year by Professor Anselm Müller, and Müller’s paper helpfully provides a structure within which the other papers of this collection can be understood. Müller argues that Anscombe has a distinctive and h elpful account of the spiritual character of human nature, not as an immaterial adj unct to an animal nature but as an aspect of the kind of rational-animal nature that h umans possess. More specifically, Müller sketches out a set of ‘reflexions on Anscomb ian lines’ which lead us to the conclusion that the spiritual nature that distingui shes human beings from the other animals, and that is the basis of specifically huma n dignity, consists in this: ‘Qua human beings, we are all of a kind such as to be gu ided in our thinking and acting by the norms of truth and goodness.’ In this context h e quotes Anscombe as saying that, ‘The reason for speaking of the spirituality of the soul [...] is not a quasi-physical common property, but that human beings are in for a final orientation towards or away from the good.’
1
From this starting point two sets of questions aris e. In the first place we may ask whether Anscombe is correct in stating that human b eings all have ‘a final orientation towards or away from the good’. Duncan Richter sets up a sceptical challenge to this, not sceptical about the reality of such an orientat ion but about its demonstrability. He questions whether it is possible to demonstrate by secular ethical reasoning the need or existence of a final, overarching, or architecto nic good against which immediate goods can be measured. Taking a concrete example, h e doubts that, without appeal to the divine, it could be shown to be more rational f rom the perspective of practical reason, ‘to prefer condemnation to die at the hands of the SS rather than join the SS and do what they have to do’. Richter’s sceptical challenge can be addressed in a variety of ways and subsequent papers seek to do so by appeal to practical truth, practical necessity, appraisal of character or social practices. José M. Torralba rea ds Anscombe as arguing that the very idea of practical reasoning implies the concep t of practical truth and this in turn implies an architectonic good against which actions are judged good or not good. This kind of formal argument may not help the would-be m artyr in Richter’s example. It will not identify thecontent of t Paul thatthe good, but will be more like the saying of S people have their minds set either on earthly thing s or heavenly things so that for some ‘their god is the belly’ (Philippians 3.19). Even i f Torralba is judged successful in his attempt to demonstrate that practical reasoning of necessity implies some ultimate end, this would not show that the ultimate end of a particular action is the same for everyone or is the true end of human nature (the end we ough t to have). The possibility that one could fail to act for the end one ought to have is indeed implied in the quotation from Anscombe who says that it is a mark of our spiritua l nature to have ‘a final orientation towardsor away fromthe good’. Richter is, in effect, concerned with the question ‘How can one justify the absolute refusal to commit injustice?’ Is such an absolute m oral obligation even intelligible apart from the context of a divine law? Matthew O’Brien a nd Thomas Pink both address the concept of ‘moral obligation’, on which Anscombe fa mously wrote in her essay ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. O’Brien argues that moral obliga tion is a species of practical necessity. ‘Obligation’, he asserts, is ‘a normativ e force of practical reason that is essentially linked with law and authority’. He argu es that the obligations of practical reason can be recognized without explicit reference to God. Nevertheless, the importance of ‘authority’ to this definition leads him to argue that ‘someone who recognizes the reality of moral obligation, but lac ks this conception of God, is in an epistemically unstable position.’ Moral obligation implicitly presupposes divine authority. This account differs from that of Pink w ho regards obligation as being linked not to moral authority but to negative moral apprai sal. Pink argues that the early-modern scholastic tradition already had a sophistic ated account of obligation which, in contrast to Anscombe, was not necessarily linked to an idea of law, and certainly not to a divine lawgiver. O’Brien and Pink thus offer dive rgent explanations for the moral force of obligations, one drawing on Anscombe and the oth er critical of Anscombe, but both seek to answer the sceptical challenge embodied by positions such as that set out by Richter. Candace Vogler considers not obligation in general but the specific obligations consequent on promising. She brings Anscombe into d ialogue not with high-scholastic philosophy but with contemporary Anglo-analytic acc ounts which are addressing a problem that troubled David Hume. She reads Anscomb e as locating theintelligibilityof promising-making in a set of practices that are pre supposed by the concept. However, she reads Anscombe as relating theobligatory characterpromises to the human of goods served by these practices. Vogler thus return s to the issue of the human good that is served by actions, practices or disposition s.
2
A second set of questions arising from Müller’s cha racterization of human nature is how the contours of this spiritual nature determine the specific ways in which its dignity is respected or violated. These questions are addresse d in the second half of this collection, beginning with Luke Gormally’s discussi on of taking human life. Intentional killing of the innocent is the archetype of failure to respect the dignity of another person. There are many practical reasons that a gov ernment might discourage citizens from killing one another, not least the maintenance of a minimal level of public order without which no social life is possible. However, discussion of homicide precisely as injusticet always, but only formore than pragmatic reasons which hold, no demands the most part. To address this challenge Gormally a ppeals to an account of dignity similar to that sketched out by Müller. While he ac knowledges that Anscombe did not develop a systematic account of dignity in relation to homicide, Gormally shows that such an account is implicitly at work in texts such as the following:
[...] man is spirit. [Anscombe wrote] He moves in the categories of innocence and answerability and desert - one of the many signs of a leap to another kind of existence from the life of the other animals. The very question ‘Why may we not kill innocent people’ asks whether it may not be justified to do so, and this is itself a manifestation of this different life.
As Müller’s paper is architectonic for the collecti on as a whole, Gormally provides the structure for the second half of the collection. Af ter these considerations of the essential injustice of homicide in the central case , David Goodill addresses the concept of the just war, a topic that Anscombe discusses in a number of places. He defends her account against Nicholas Denyer and others who alle ge that killing in warfare can no longer be justified, if indeed it ever could. As Go odill discusses homicide that may nevertheless be just, my own paper discusses the is sue of abortion which Anscombe regarded as unjust but which she thought might not always constitute homicide. Anscombe was not convinced that the early human emb ryo was a human being in the sense of ‘aMenschif we are talking German, ananthropos in Greek, ahomoin Latin’, but she was convinced that intentional destruction of the human embryo was murderous, if murder is understood in a non-pedanti c sense. If the dignity of human nature is constituted by an orientation towards truth and goodness then lying will be another archetypal fail ure to respect that dignity. Kevin Flannery discusses the issue through Anscombe’s cri tique of a Jesuit moralist Vermeersch. Flannery admits her main criticisms of Vermeersch are sound but argues that her alternative raises issues regarding the na ture of venial sin, concerning which Thomas Aquinas proves a helpful guide. Flannery pro vides insights into an argument of Anscombe in relation to lying, but does not address the theme of honesty as a virtuous disposition of character and the need to cultivate discretion as well as seeking to tell the truth and to avoid lying. These broader aspects are considered by Roger Teichmann with reference to Anscombe’s article ‘On Being in Good Faith’. It seems that, not only someone’s statements, but also his o r her thoughts are capable of being insincere (or sincere); and this is of importance f or the question whether one can be responsible for one’s thoughts. When considering sincerity, honesty or virtue gener ally, understood as something honourable in itself, the Western moral tradition h as given particular place to the virtue of chastity. Indeed there have been periods when th e word ‘virtue’ was used as synonym for this particular virtue. Mary Geach argu es that the virtue of chastity is one of the virtues which relates to the final human end in that it prevents disturbances and distortions of the mind that hinder the contemplati on of God. This understanding of the virtue of chastity, despite its roots in the classi cal tradition, in Plato and Aristotle, and its prominence in the early Christian tradition, is rarely defended in modern accounts either secular or religious. Even in Anscombe’s tho ught chastity as a ‘shining virtue’ is less prominent than the discussion of sexual acts i n relation to marriage and procreation. Geach provides an account along Anscom bian lines that seeks to recover an appreciation of this aspect of the virtue. The final paper in this second section concerns not particular aspects of the human
