Outsourced Empire , livre ebook

Outsourced Empire
Outsourced Empire
How Militias, Mercenaries, and Contractors Support US Statecraft
Andrew Thomson
First published 2018 by Pluto Press
345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA
www.plutobooks.com
Copyright Andrew Thomson 2018
The right of Andrew Thomson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 0 7453 3705 0 Hardback
ISBN 978 0 7453 3703 6 Paperback
ISBN 978 1 7868 0262 0 PDF eBook
ISBN 978 1 7868 0264 4 Kindle eBook
ISBN 978 1 7868 0263 7 EPUB eBook



This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental standards of the country of origin.
Typeset by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England
Simultaneously printed in the United Kingdom and United States of America
Contents
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
Introduction
1 US Imperial Statecraft and Para-Institutional Forces
2 Covert Regime Change in the Early Cold War: Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly Government
3 Counterinsurgent Statecraft: Militias, Mercenaries, and Contractors
4 Reagan, Low-Intensity Conflict, and the Expansion of Para-Institutional Statecraft
5 Continuity After the Cold War and the Consolidation of Para-Institutional Complexes
6 The War on Terror, Irregular Warfare, and the Global Projection of Force
Conclusions
Notes
Index
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AA
Air America
AAA
American Anti-Communist Alliance
ALP
Afghan Local Police
AMISOM
African Union Mission to Somalia
ANA
Afghan National Army
ANAP
Afghan National Auxiliary Police
ANMC
American National Management Corporation
ANP
Afghan National Police
ANSENSAL
Agencia Nacional de Seguridad de El Salvador -National Security Agency of El Salvador
ARVN
Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AUC
Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia -United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
CAD
Comit s de Auto-Defensa (Peru)
CAFGU
Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit (Philippines)
CAT
Civil Air Transport
CEA
California Eastern Airways
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CIDF
Civilian Irregular Defense Forces
CIDG
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
CMA
Civilian Military Assistance
CORDS
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Developmental Support
CORU
Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations
CPA
Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq)
CSDF
Civilian Self-Defense Forces
DDR
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD
Department of Defense
EAST
Eagle Aviation Services and Technology
ELN
Ej rcito de Liberaci n Nacional- Army of National Liberation (Colombia)
ERU
Emergency Response Unit (Iraq)
EZLN
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional- Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Mexico)
FARC
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FATA
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FDI
Foreign Direct Investment
FID
Foreign Internal Defense
FM
Field Manual
FSA
Free Syrian Army
GNA
Government of National Accord (Libya)
HN
Host Nation
IDAD
Internal Defense and Development
IMET
International Military Education and Training
IMF
International Monetary Fund
ISIS
Islamic State
ISOF
Iraqi Special Operations Forces
ITT
International Telephone and Telegraph
IW
Irregular Warfare
JCET
Joint Combined Exercise Training program
LIC
Low-Intensity Conflict
LOGCAP
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
MACV
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAS
Muerte a los Secuestradores -Death to Kidnappers (Colombia)
MILF
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
MOOTW
Military Operations Other Than War
MNCs
Multinational Corporations
MPRI
Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MTTs
Mobile Training Teams
NAFTA
North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLF
National Liberation Front
NPA
New People s Army (Philippines)
NSAM
National Security Action Memorandum
NSC
National Security Council
OIDP
Overseas Internal Defense Policy
OMB
Office of Management and Budget
ORDEN
Organizaci n Democratica Nacionalista- Nationalist Democratic Organization (Nicaragua)
PAC
Patrulla de Auto-Defensa Civil -Civil Self-Defense Patrol
PGMD
Pro-Government Militias Database
PMCs
Private Military Companies
PNAC
Project for a New American Century
PRD
Partido de la Revoluci n (Mexico)
PRI
Partido Revolucionario Institucional -Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico)
PRU
Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSYOPS
Psychological Operations
RMA
Revolution in Military Affairs
SAIC
Science Applications International Corporation
SANG
Saudi Arabian National Guard
SAS
Special Air Service
SAT
Southern Air Transport
SDF
Syrian Democratic Forces
SIJIN
Secci n de Investigaciones Judiciales e Inteligencia de la Polic a -Judicial Police Investigative and Intelligence Unit (Colombia)
SOA
School of the Americas
SOCOM
United States Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM
United States Southern Command
TWA
Trans World Airlines
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCLA
Unilaterally Controlled Latino Asset
UK
United Kingdom (of Great Britain)
UNITA
Uni o Nacional para a Independ ncia Total de Angola -National Unity for Total Independence of Angola (Angola)
US
United States (of America)
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
VC
Viet Cong
WACL
World Anti-Communist League
WTO
World Trade Organization
YPG
Yek ney n Parastina Gel -Kurdish People s Protection Units (Syria)
Introduction
Before the US-led Coalition invaded Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein in March 2003, CIA and Special Forces teams had already entered the country. Their mission was to mobilize internal opposition to weaken Hussein s regime from within and to prepare the ground for the arrival of US military forces. In February 2002, joint CIA and Special Force teams (labeled Northern Iraq Liaison Elements) met with Kurdish Peshmerga and organized for their fighters to wage an insurgency against the government. The CIA trained, paid, and coordinated Peshmerga insurgents to conduct raids, ambushes, and sabotage missions. 1 Kurdish militias also helped identify targets for US aerial strikes. During the US-led military invasion (March-May 2003), these Kurdish forces operated alongside US troops to take over key areas in the north of the country and to push Saddam s army to the south. In the months leading to the invasion, the CIA also spent millions of dollars developing a guerrilla paramilitary unit called the Scorpions, with the aim of attacking infrastructure such as bridges and government facilities and to cultivate support amongst the population for a rebellion against the Iraqi state. 2 In addition, US officials approved funding for organizing Iraqi exiles into militias to help in the invasion. 3 The Department of Defense (DoD) trained a semi-official military force of Iraqis in Hungary, for example, to enhance US military-civil relations in Iraq during the invasion. 4 Many non-state armed groups aided the US military before and during the invasion of Iraq.
After the invasion and the removal of the Baathist party from power, the US struggled to contain a growing multi-dimensional insurgency that featured anti-occupational opposition, remnants of the Baathist party, and Islamist Jihadists. As part of the ensuing counterinsurgent project to stabilize a new political and economic order in Iraq, US military forces were reinforced by a variety of non-state armed actors. Private military companies (PMCs) and private security contractors flooded onto the scene. Most operated in support roles, such as base maintenance, allowing the US military to concentrate on its front-line tasks. Many others formed central parts of the coercive mechanisms of US statecraft, conducting interrogations, operating technical military equipment, and serving as security to protect vital infrastructure, among many other roles. Private military contractors were also hired to train personnel for the new Iraqi military and police services as well as select counter-insurgent militia forces. Meanwhile, US military planners supported militia and commando paramilitary forces. Many observers and US personnel alike compared these forces to US support for death squads in Latin America during the Cold War and paramilitary programs implemented in Vietnam, such as the Phoenix program. 5 Even the success of the US troop surge, which saw tens of thousands of US soldiers enter the country to overpower the insurgency, partially hinged on turning former insurgents and gaining the support of Sunni tribal groups in a militia program known as the Sons of Iraq. 6
As more power was transferred to the newly established Iraqi government, similar patterns of military public-private partnerships continued, with US advisors and the Iraqi state employing PMCs, paying mercenaries and warlord factions, and cajoling a myriad of militia forces. 7 Towards the end of the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US adopted a train, advise, and assist mission to support the Iraqi government and its military and police forces without the involvement of significant numbers of US soldiers on the ground. In this advisory role, US officials acquiesced to and forged alliances with militias and paramilitary forces as a counterinsurgent vanguard. 8 US assistance to the Iraqi Armed Forces was also leveraged through PMCs and security contractors paid for by both the US and the Iraqi state. Then, when the Islamic State (ISIS) invaded some of the northern territories of Iraq, expanding their territorial acquisitions across the Syrian-Iraq border, the US and its Iraqi state military allies