Ruling Oneself Out , livre ebook

442

pages

English

Ebooks

2008

Écrit par
Ermakoff Ivan Ermakoff

Publié par
Duke University Press

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442

pages

English

Ebooks

2008

Lire un extrait

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne En savoir plus

Publié par

Duke University Press

Date de parution

21 avril 2008

Nombre de lectures

EAN13

9780822388722

Langue

English

Poids de l'ouvrage

3 Mo

What induces groups to commit political suicide? This book explores the decisions to surrender power and to legitimate this surrender: collective abdications. Commonsensical explanations impute such actions to coercive pressures, actors' miscalculations, or their contamination by ideologies at odds with group interests. Ivan Ermakoff argues that these explanations are either incomplete or misleading. Focusing on two paradigmatic cases of voluntary and unconditional surrender of power-the passing of an enabling bill granting Hitler the right to amend the Weimar constitution without parliamentary supervision (March 1933), and the transfer of full executive, legislative, and constitutional powers to Marshal Petain (Vichy, France, July 1940)-Ruling Oneself Out recasts abdication as the outcome of a process of collective alignment.Ermakoff distinguishes several mechanisms of alignment in troubled and uncertain times and assesses their significance through a fine-grained examination of actors' beliefs, shifts in perceptions, and subjective states. To this end, he draws on the analytical and methodological resources of perspectives that usually stand apart: primary historical research, formal decision theory, the phenomenology of group processes, quantitative analyses, and the hermeneutics of testimonies. In elaborating this dialogue across disciplinary boundaries, Ruling Oneself Out restores the complexity and indeterminate character of pivotal collective decisions and demonstrates that an in-depth historical exploration can lay bare processes of crucial importance for understanding the formation of political preferences, the paradox of self-deception, and the makeup of historical events as highly consequential.

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Publié par

Duke University Press

Date de parution

21 avril 2008

EAN13

9780822388722

Langue

English

Poids de l'ouvrage

3 Mo

RULING ONESELF OUT

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, ,   A series from e Inernaional Insiue a e Universiy of Micigan

  George Seinmez and Julia Adams

    Fernando Coronil Mamadou Diouf Micael Duon Geoﬀ Eley Fama Müge Göce Nancy Rose Hun Andreas Kalyvas We Keane David Laiin Lydia Liu Julie Sursi Margare Somers Ann Laura Soler Kaerine Verdery Elizae Wingrove

Sponsored y e Inernaional Insiue a e Universiy of Micigan and pulised y Due Universiy Press, is series is cenered around culural and isorical sudies of power, poliics, and e sae—a ﬁeld a cus across e disciplines of isory, sociology, anropology, poliical science, and culural sudies. he focus on e relaionsip eween sae and culure refers o o a meodological approac—e sudy of poliics and e sae using culuralis meods—and a susanive one a reas signifying pracices as an essenial dimension of poliics. he dialecic of poliics, culure, and isory ﬁgures prominenly in all e oos seleced for e series.

Ruling Oneself Out

A heory of Collective Abdications

■ ■ ■

Ivan Ermakoff

Due Universiy PressDuram&London■ ■

Prined in e Unied Saes of America on acid-free paper ♾ Typese in Minion y Tseng Informaion Sysems, Inc.

Lirary of Congress Caaloging-in-Pulicaion Daa appear on e las prined page of is oo.

CONTENTS

■ ■ ■

Lis of Tales vii Lis of Figures ix Preface xi Acnowledgmens xxxi A Noe on Ciaions xxxv

 : he Sage and e Prolem 

1 Acors and Evens  2 Consiuional Adicaion 

 : Suservience, Common Sense 

3 Coercion   Miscalculaion   Ideological Collusion 

 : he Terms of e Callenge 

 Collecive Alignmen: hree Processes   Diﬀusion 

 : Collecive Sances 

 he Producion of Consen  9 Vacillaions, Convergence 

 : Coda: Judgmens of Signiﬁcance 

10 he Consisency of Inconsisency  11 he Even as Saemen 

Appendix A: Couns and Accouns  Appendix B: A Two-Pronged Model of Alignmen 

Biliograpy 

Index 

TA B L E S

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1 Paries and e Weimar Repulic, Sepemer –July ,  2 Paries and e Weimar Repulic, July –Novemer ,  3 he Parliamenary Elecion of  Marc ,   Disriuion of Seas in e Reicsag in e Asence of Communis Delegaes, Marc ,   Voe for e Reynaud Caine in e Camer of Depuies,  Marc ,   Breadown of e Voe in e Naional Assemly,  July ,   Voing Beaviors and Miliary Occupaion,  8 Poliical Camps and Miliary Occupaion,  9 Coeﬃciens from e Mulinomial Logisic Regression of Voe on Assemly (Senae = ), Miliary Occupaion, and Poliical Camp (N= 67),  10 Voe Inclinaion on  Marc and Class Origin,  11 Odds of a “No” Voe in Meeing of Cener Delegaion,  Marc , y Occupaional Group,  12 Aendance in Bordeaux and Vicy: Cronological Assessmens,  13 Asenees on  July,  1 Parliamenarians Wo Signed e Bergery Declaraion (Lis as of  July: Bergery Personal Papers),  1 Socialis Depuies Cross-Classiﬁed y heir Voes on e Blum and Faure Resoluions a e Monrouge Congress (Decemer ) and on e Graning of Special Powers o Marsal Péain,  July ,  1 Pre-war Paciﬁsm and Poliical Sance in Vicy: he case of e Socialis Depuies (Odds Raios of voing “Yes” on  July ,N= ),  1 Logisic Regression of e Voe on  July on Miliary Occupaion and Moions on Peace and War for Socialis () Parliamenarians,  18 Voes and Occupaion in July : Lawyers versus Non-lawyers (N= 64),  19 Lawyers’ Proailiy of Voing “Yes” (N= 64),  20 he Cener Delegaes: Voe Preferences on e Enaling Bill ( Marc ) and Elecion Disrics,  21 References o e Pulic Sance of Prominen Acors (N= ),  22 Classiﬁcaion Grids and References o Pulic Sances (N= ), 

viii

Lis of Tales

23 Alignmens: Varians and heir Frequencies for All Tesimonies (N= ),  2 Explanaory Claims: All Accouns (N= ),  2 he Swindle Argumen and e Reference o Prominen Acors’ Pulic Sances (N= ),  2 Explanaory Claims in Narraives (N= 6),  2 Types of Sources, Marc ,  28 Types of Sources, July ,  29 Poliical Aﬃliaions and Accouns, July ,  30 Accouns and Decisional Sances, July ,  31 Value Parameers for Figure ,  32 Updaing e Cos of a Misae,  33 Assessing e Cos of a Misae in Lig of Indecision,  3 Belief Updaing: A Numerical Example, 

FIGURES

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1 Adicaion game,  2 Consiuional adicaion or opposiion?  3 Expeced payoﬀs,   Nesed games,   Nesed games: generic version,   Individual accouns: producion, formal srucure, and conen,   Ego’s confronaion wi e auoriarian callenger,  8 An example of uiliy funcions producing a relaive resold,  9 hresold disriuion and sequenial alignmen,  10 Prior eliefs aou e lieliood of opposiion: ree ypoeses,  11 Updaed eliefs (n= ,k= 6),  12 he fuure sance of e group reassessed from ego’s sandpoin,  13 Belief updae in lig of a resold value of .,  1 Belief updae in lig of a resold value of .5,  1 Belief updae in lig of a resold value of .7,  1 Belief updae in lig of a resold value of .,  1 A saemen producing greaer uncerainy, 

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