Wittgenstein's Account of Truth , livre ebook

165

pages

English

Ebooks

2012

Écrit par
Sara Ellenbogen

Publié par
State University of New York Press

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165

pages

English

Ebooks

2012

Lire un extrait

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne En savoir plus

Publié par

State University of New York Press

Date de parution

01 février 2012

Nombre de lectures

EAN13

9780791487365

Langue

English

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use," what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

Abbreviations

Preface

Acknowledgments

PART I. FROM "MEANING IS USE" TO THE REJECTION OF TRANSCENDENT TRUTH

1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism

2. The Positive Account of Truth

3. Antirealism Revisited

PART II. FROM "MEANING IS USE" TO SEMANTIC ANTIREALISM

4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion

5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism

6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett

7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent

PART III. WHY A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH?

8. Criteria and Justification Conditions

9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions

10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible

11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth

12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth?

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Voir

Publié par

State University of New York Press

Date de parution

01 février 2012

EAN13

9780791487365

Langue

English

Wittgenstein’s Account of Truth

SUNY series in Philosophy

George R. Lucas Jr., editor

Wittgenstein’s Account of Truth

;

Sara Ellenbogen

State University of New York Press

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, address State University of New York Press, 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207

Production by Judith Block Marketing by Patrick Durocher

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ellenbogen, Sara. Wittgenstein’s account of truth / Sara Ellenbogen. p. cm. — (SUNY series in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index. ISBN 0-7914-5625-0 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-5626-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889–1951. 2. Truth. I. Title. II. Series.

B3376.W56.E52 2003 121'.091—dc21

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

2002067041

For Ann and Lenny Feinzig

“Knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgment.” —On Certainty#378

Abbreviations Preface Acknowledgments

;

Contents

PART I FROM “MEANING IS USE” TO THE REJECTION OF TRANSCENDENT TRUTH 1. Wittgenstein’s Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism 2. The Positive Account of Truth 3. Antirealism Revisited

PART II FROM “MEANING IS USE” TO SEMANTIC ANTIREALISM 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism 6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent

PART III WHY A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH? 8. Criteria and Justiﬁcation Conditions 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions

vii

ix xi xv

2 6 19

25 27 34 44 55

59 61 75

viii

Wittgenstein’s Account of Truth

10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth?

Notes

Bibliography

Index

90 110

117

137

145

B.B.

P.I.

P.R.

O.C.

Preface

;

Abbreviations

The Blue and Brown Books

Philosophical Investigations

Philosophical Remarks

On Certainty

Zettel

Voir