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246
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English
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2008
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Publié par
Date de parution
28 février 2008
Nombre de lectures
0
EAN13
9780791478776
Langue
English
Poids de l'ouvrage
1 Mo
How much authority should language, the medium of communication, be accorded as a determinant of truth and therefore of what we say? Garth L. Hallett argues that, although never explicitly debated, this is the most significant issue of linguistic philosophy. Here, for the first time, he traces the issue's story. Starting with representative thinkers—Plato, Aquinas, Kant, Frege, and the early Wittgenstein—who contested language's authority, the narrative then focuses on thinkers such as Carnap, Tarski, the later Wittgenstein, Flew, Russell, Malcolm, Austin, Kripke, Putnam, Strawson, Quine, and Habermas who, in different ways and to varying degrees, accorded language more authority. Implicit in this account is a challenge to philosophy as still widely practiced.
Preface
1. The Issue of Language’s Authority
2. The Question’s Centrality
3. Plato’s Recourse to Nonlinguistic Forms
4. Aquinas and the Primacy of Mental Truth
5. The Tractatus: Precise Thought versus Imprecise Language
6. Carnap’s Limited Linguistic Turn
7. Tarski, Truth, and Claims of Linguistic Incoherence
8. Wittgenstein’s Acceptance of the Authority of Language
9. Wittgenstein versus Theoretical “Intuitions”
10. Flew and Paradigm-Case Arguments
11. Russell’s Critique of “Common Sense”
12. Malcolm and the “Ordinary-Language” Debate
13. Austin, Statements, and Their Truth
14. A Lead Overlooked: From Meaning to Truth
15. Kripke, Putnam, and Rigid Designation
16. Quine, Linguistic Truths, and Holistic Theory
17. Quine, Indeterminacy, and the Opacity of Language
18. Rorty, Stich, and Pragmatic Assertability
19. Habermas, Communicative Speech, and Validity
20. Past, Present, and Future: An Overview
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Voir
Preface
1. The Issue of Language’s Authority
2. The Question’s Centrality
3. Plato’s Recourse to Nonlinguistic Forms
4. Aquinas and the Primacy of Mental Truth
5. The Tractatus: Precise Thought versus Imprecise Language
6. Carnap’s Limited Linguistic Turn
7. Tarski, Truth, and Claims of Linguistic Incoherence
8. Wittgenstein’s Acceptance of the Authority of Language
9. Wittgenstein versus Theoretical “Intuitions”
10. Flew and Paradigm-Case Arguments
11. Russell’s Critique of “Common Sense”
12. Malcolm and the “Ordinary-Language” Debate
13. Austin, Statements, and Their Truth
14. A Lead Overlooked: From Meaning to Truth
15. Kripke, Putnam, and Rigid Designation
16. Quine, Linguistic Truths, and Holistic Theory
17. Quine, Indeterminacy, and the Opacity of Language
18. Rorty, Stich, and Pragmatic Assertability
19. Habermas, Communicative Speech, and Validity
20. Past, Present, and Future: An Overview
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Publié par
Date de parution
28 février 2008
Nombre de lectures
0
EAN13
9780791478776
Langue
English
Poids de l'ouvrage
1 Mo
Linguistic Philosophy The Central Story
Garth L. Hallett
Linguistic Philosophy
SUNY series in Philosophy
George R. Lucas Jr., editor
Linguistic Philosophy
The Central Story
Garth L. Hallett
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 2008 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu
Production by Diane Ganeles Marketing by Anne M. Valentine
Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data
Hallett, Garth. Linguistic philosophy : the central story / Garth L. Hallett. p. cm. — (SUNY series in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7914-7361-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7914-7362-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Language and languages—Philosophy. I. Title. P107.H347 2008 401—dc22
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
2007024535
Preface
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CONTENTS
The Issue of Language’s Authority
The Question’s Centrality
Plato’s Recourse to Nonlinguistic Forms
Aquinas and the Primacy of Mental Truth
TheTractatus:
Precise Thought versus Imprecise Language
Carnap’s Limited Linguistic Turn
Tarski, Truth, and Claims of Linguistic Incoherence
Wittgenstein’s Acceptance of the Authority of Language
Wittgenstein versus Theoretical “Intuitions”
10. Flew and Paradigm-Case Arguments
11. Russell’s Critique of “Common Sense”
12. Malcolm and the “Ordinary-Language” Debate
13. Austin, Statements, and Their Truth
14. A Lead Overlooked: From Meaning to Truth
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33
43
53
61
73
83
91
101
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115
vi
Contents
15. Kripke, Putnam, and Rigid Designation
16. Quine, Linguistic Truths, and Holistic Theory
17. Quine, Indeterminacy, and the Opacity of Language
18. Rorty, Stich, and Pragmatic Assertability
19. Habermas, Communicative Speech, and Validity
20. Past, Present, and Future: An Overview
Notes
Bibliography
Index
125
137
149
157
165
171
185
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231
PREFACE
“The aspects of things that are most important for us,” Ludwig Wittgen-stein observed, “are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity.” We fail to be struck “by what, once seen, is most striking and most pow-1 erful.” The story here recounted illustrates Wittgenstein’s point. For the central, most significant issue of linguistic philosophy is one its devotees did not explicitly state or address, in so many words, even at the peak of linguistic interest in the last century. Yet it is an issue that has divided lin-guistic and nonlinguistic philosophers, and it has lost none of its interest in our day. Simply put, the question is this: to what extent shouldlan-guage, as medium of communication, determine what we say? Clearly, the linguistic medium employed (whether standard or stipulated, natural or artificial) does and should play some role, for the realities we describe, report, explain, or otherwise characterize do not by themselves tell us what words to use. For example, the flakes falling from the sky do not tell us to call them snow rather than rain, sleet, or butterflies; the English lan-guage does. The flakes and the language, together, dictate the right term to use. Or so it might seem. However, in the history of thought and espe-cially in recent times, there has been profound disagreement on how much authority to grant language as a determinant of truth or assertabil-ity, and on how its authority, whether slight or great, should be under-stood and exercised. Talk about language’s “authority” to determine what we say may sound strange, partly because it is unfamiliar, partly because it seems in-appropriate. Speech, after all, is determined by thought and thought is de-termined by the objects of thought. There, it seems, is where authority resides—in thought and its objects. Speech is doubly derivative. However, the dependence also runs the other way. As chapter 1 will note, language largely determines not only how we speak but also how we think and how we conceive the things we think and speak about. The question is, just how deep and decisive should its influence be?
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Preface
Evidently linguistic, this question is also clearly philosophical. For, though it extends far beyond philosophy, it implicates the whole of phi-losophy: it concerns “Body and mind are identical,” “Meaning is use,” or “God created the universe” as much as it does “It’s snowing,” “Napoleon invaded Russia,” or “Molecules consist of atoms.” Further, the question arises more frequently and acutely in philosophy than it does, say, in chemistry, geometry, or coffee-break gossip. For in philosophy, language has faced more numerous, powerful rivals than it has in most other disci-plines or areas of discourse. Furthermore, as even the present introductory study will attest, the issue of language’s authority is so complex and diffi-cult that only philosophy can adequately address it. And philosophers have, in fact, come closest to confronting the issue. They may not have asked squarely “How much authority should language exercise in deter-mining what we say?” but they have repeatedly beaten around this bush. The general question can be put in sharper focus: Should the lan-guage employed be recognized as the principal factor bridging the gap be-tween reality and its proper description? From Plato to the present, most philosophers, favoring one or the other of language’s competitors, have implicitly denied language such a role. Somewhat more explicitly, nu-merous linguistic philosophers, accepting language’s authority, have an-swered in the affirmative. (It is this, primarily, that makes them linguistic philosophers, as I here use the term, and not merely philosophers who study language.) They have differed notably, however, in their under-standing of language’s guidance. My hope and expectation is that map-ping this multiplicity of views, both negative and positive, will help readers reach greater clarity on this crucial issue of linguistic philoso-phy—indeed of philosophy in general. Whereas the claims of “ordinary language” were briefly debated in the last century, the authority oflanguageto determine what we say, though profoundly challenged for millennia, has never been explicitly de-bated. Herein lies the answer, or at least a principal answer, to a possible puzzle. How strange it may seem, on reflection, that there should be such a thing as “linguistic philosophy.” After all, there are no linguistic physi-cists, anthropologists, historians, or zoologists. The very notion that there might be sounds bizarre. But if specialists in other fields feel no need to obsess about language, why should philosophers? To this query the pre-sent work furnishes a reply, perhaps the most important. Outside philos-ophy and other areas of speculative inquiry, there is little need to say much about language, because there is relatively little disagreement about how to employ it. Inside philosophy, where, for reasons that will appear, basic disagreement prevails about the authority of language, there is con-sequently much disagreement about how to use it. As long as this dis-agreement persists and pervasively affects philosophical practice in
Preface
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fundamental ways, language will demand constant attention. When and if philosophers reach consensus with regard to language’s authority, there will be no such need. A linguistic philosopher, too, can long for that day. In response, therefore, to the common complaint that linguistic philosophers are in-terested only in words, I proffer a parable. Two men are confined in a prison cell. One, lounging against the wall, is observing the other sawing away at the cell window’s bars with a nail file. “Strange man!” comments the first. “He has no soul, no vision. He is interested only in bars.” No, he is interested in freedom. So, too, is the linguistic philosopher who saws on the bars of language. He desires to be free simply to use language, as those beyond the bars do, without the constant, distracting need to talk about language. But he and his cellmates will not enjoy that freedom so long as there persists such deep and widespread disagreement, among both linguistic and nonlinguistic philosophers, about the authority and proper use of language. The bars are still as solid today as they were fifty or a hundred years ago—or two thousand. It may appear that in answering one puzzle I have introduced an-other. What subtle insanity or perverse ingenuity am I attributing, by in-sinuation, to philosophers, that they should have constructed and inhabited a linguistic prison while the rest of humanity enjoyed greater freedom from linguistic obstacles and distractions? None—I intend no such imputation. Philosophers’ linguistic problems have arisen, I suggest, not from thinking more confusedly than other people but from thinking more about confusing problems—problems that, to borrow a phrase, “have the character of depth”: “their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our 2 language.” What presently appears greatly needed is not a return to rel-ative unreflective unanimity in verbal practice, but, rather, an advance to relativereflectiveunanimity—or at least to greater consensus than cur-rently exists. Previously, I addressed this issue systematically. Here, I review it his-torically, with a broader audience in view. This explains the book’s style. In any reader likely to read such a work, I can presume a certain amount of philosophical background, but I cannot assume that all readers will be well acquainted with every one of the thinkers, from Plato to Jürgen Habermas, here considered. Accordingly, though individual discussions may interest specialists as well as nonspecialists, I shall typically say more by way of introduction and explanation than I would if I were writing solely for the former. I am grateful for the assistance of generous readers: Suzanne Cun-ningham, Gerard Hughes, and Nicholas Rescher, who read the whole work in various drafts; and Robert Audi, Michael Barber, Scott Berman,
