Aristotle's Politics Today , livre ebook
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2012
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176
pages
English
Ebooks
2012
Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne En savoir plus
Publié par
Date de parution
01 février 2012
Nombre de lectures
0
EAN13
9780791479360
Langue
English
Poids de l'ouvrage
2 Mo
According to Aristotle, man's essential sociality implies a distinctive conception of politics, one in which all political associations exist for the sake of the moral perfection of human beings. This stands in sharp contrast with the modern view of politics that man is not "by nature" political; rather, man chooses to create political associations for the sake of securing the protection of his life and property. Many political theorists have begun to express doubts about this modern view, calling for a return to Aristotle's vision of a politics that is deeply moral. In Aristotle's Politics Today, distinguished political philosophers representing a diversity of approaches examine the meaning, relevance, and implications of Aristotle's political thought for contemporary social and political theory. The contributors engage a broad range of topics, including Aristotle's views on constitutionalism, the extension of Aristotelian ideas to issues in international relations, the place of Aristotelian virtue in modern democratic politics, and Aristotle's conception of justice.
Contributors
Index Locorum
Index
Voir
Introduction
Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talisse
1. Aristotelian Statecraft and Modern Politics
Fred D. Miller, Jr.
2. Aristotle and the Liberal State
Edward C. Halper
3. Why Democrats Need the Virtues
Robert B. Talisse
4. Virtue-oriented Politics: Confucius and Aristotle
May Sim
5. The Morality of Nations: An Aristotelian Approach
Lloyd P. Gerson
6. The Revolt of the Just
Eugene Garver
7. Aristotle's Regime of the Americans
Peter L. P. Simpson
8. Aristotle's Polity Today
Lenn E. Goodman
Contributors
Index Locorum
Index
Publié par
Date de parution
01 février 2012
EAN13
9780791479360
Langue
English
Poids de l'ouvrage
2 Mo
Aristotle’s PoliticsToday Edited by Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talisse
A ’ P T RISTOTLE S OLITICS ODAY
SUNYSERIESIN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY ANTHONY PREUS, EDITOR
A ’ P T RISTOTLE S OLITICS ODAY
EDITEDBY LENN E. GOODMANAND ROBERT B. TALISSE
STATE UNIVERSITYOF NEW YORK PRESS
Cover photo, “The Parthenon Today,” by Roberta W. Goodman © 2007, courtesy of Roberta W. Goodman
Pubîshed by State Unîversîty of New York Press, Abany
© 2007 State Unîversîty of New York
A rîghts reserved
Prînted în the Unîted States of Amerîca
No part of thîs book may be used or reproduced în any manner whatsoever wîthout wrîtten permîssîon. No part of thîs book may be stored în a retrîeva system or transmîtted în any form or by any means încudîng eectronîc, eectrostatîc, magnetîc tape, mechanîca, photocopyîng, recordîng, or otherwîse wîthout the prîor permîssîon în wrîtîng of the pubîsher.
For înformatîon, contact State Unîversîty of New York Press, Abany, NY www.sunypress.edu
Productîon by Dana Foote Marketîng by Mîchae Campochîaro
Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data
Arîstote’s Poîtîcs today / edîted by Lenn E. Goodman, Robert B. Taîsse. p. cm. — (SUNY serîes în ancîent Greek phîosophy) Incudes bîbîographîca references and îndex. ISBN 978-0-7914-7227-9 (hardcover : ak. paper) 1. State, The. 2. Arîstote. Poîtîcs. I. Goodman, Lenn Evan, 1944– II. Taîsse, Robert B.
JC11.A75 2007 320.092—dc22
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2006101109
The Moraîty of Natîons: An Arîstoteîan Approach Lloyd P. Gerson
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Vîrtue-orîented Poîtîcs: Confucîus and Arîstote May Sîm
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Introductîon Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talîsse
Arîstote and the Lîbera State Edward C. Halper
CONTENTS
1
Arîstoteîan Statecraft and Modern Poîtîcs Fred D. Mîller, Jr.
5
Arîstote’sRegîme of the Amerîcans Peter L. P. Sîmpson
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Why Democrats Need the Vîrtues Robert B. Talîsse
Contrîbutors
Works Cîted
Index
v
8
The Revot of the Just Eugene Garver
Arîstote’s Poîty Today Lenn E. Goodman
Index Locorum
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INTRODUCTION Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talîsse
we-known phîosopher who îved through amost a of the badAhabît îsn’t conined to phîosophers, of course. We’ve often seen prema-twentîeth century used to remark on the penchant some phîoso-phers have for announcîng the death of theîr own dîscîpîne. That ture obîtuarîes about art în genera or igura art în partîcuar, or yrîc poetry, or musîc, or meody, the nove, or reîgîon. It was even thought, around the end of the nîneteenth century, that physîcs was about inîshed and nothîng was eft but to i în the ast few decîma paces în the key Newtonîan constants. That was just on the eve of the Mîchaeson-Morey experîment, whîch paved the way for Eînsteîn’s work and opened the door to the expand-îng unîverse of quantum mechanîcs, the nucear age, and strîng theory. Our phîosopher, however, had îved ong enough to see metaphysîcs, poîtîca phîosophy, aesthetîcs, normatîve ethîcs and normatîve epîstemoogy, among other branches of phîosophîca înquîry, revîve more than once from the overhasty and sometîmes overeager death announcements. Hîs observatîon was that before ît had even become trîte to say that thîs or that varîety of phîosophy was washed up some young kîd woud start readîng Arîstote, and everythîng began anew and fresh. It was Arîstote who saîd that phîosophy begîns în wonder. He was too much a beîever în cyces of hîstory, too much Pato’s student, and too ready to probe the vîews of the many and the wîse to thînk thathe had started anythîng from scratch. But he dîd ay out în paîn terms, wîthout the coak of dîaogue or a thîck veî of poetîc tropes, many of the astîng questîons and învîtîng answers that have put phîosophers to work from hîs tîme down to our own. Nowhere was that more true than în poîtîca phîosophy. But îs ît true that Arîstote’s thoughts on poîtîcs have any îfe eft în them for today? What, we mîght ask, haveweto earn about poîtîcs from an ancîent thînker who wrote în Greek and îved at Athens but was not even an Athenîan, et aone a commîtted democrat? What have we to earn în poîtîca phîosophy from a man who coud accept savery as an înstîtutîon, who dîd not see women as men’s equas, who had a îvey înterest în hîstorîca and poîtîca tradîtîons but nothîng much to say about the poîtîcs of group îdentîty?
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L E. G R B. T ENN OODMAN AND OBERT ALISSE
A common answer, we suspect, îs that Arîstote has îtte to teach us modern îbera democrats. Aren’t Arîstote’s vîews on the nature and purpose of the state, the meanîng of cîtîzenshîp, and the orderîng of poîtîca înstî-tutîons not ony archaîc, because they rest on an expoded metaphysîcs, but unacceptabe, because they sîght the modern stapes of poîtîca egîtîmacy: forma equaîty, îndîvîdua rîghts, negatîve îberty, mora neutraîty, and demo-cratîc rue. For those who ind these fundamentas of normatîve dîscourse about poîtîcs însuficîent today, and who ca for more robust commîtments to dîfferentîa equaîty, group rîghts, and îdentîty caîms, Arîstote’s vîsîon of a poîty whose purpose îs to promote vîrtue seems even more remote. The chapters coected în thîs voume aîm to chaenge the common-pace perceptîon of Arîstote as a thînker as panted irmy în the “îberty of the ancîents”—and therefore îrreevant to those who seek to theorîze the “îberty of the moderns,” as Benjamîn Constant framed the contrast. The chapters represent dîfferent methodoogîca and conceptua focî. But they a endeavor to brîng Arîstote înto conversatîon wîth contemporary theorîsts. In most înstances, they ind that Arîstote îndeed has much to say to us. Consîder the questîon of equaîty. Arîstote îs a vauabe companîon în our dîscussîons here, precîsey for hîs openness. He does not share our famî-îar sayîsms about equaîty. He does not assume that a humans are equa în taent, skî, înteect, or abîîty. He does not even assume that we are a mora equas. Hîs vîews here jange our sensîbîîtîes, schooed în the sacred-ness of human dîgnîty and the rhetorîc of democracy. And yet, Arîstote’s freedom from the commîtments we hod dear makes hîm a puraîst about the varîetîes of equaîty, as he îs about so many other topîcs, from the marks of substantîaîty to the dîmensîons of human vîrtue. He can revîew the Pythagorean reductîon of justîce to recîprocîty, dîsmîss the mechanîca equa-tîon of justîce wîth sîmpy makîng “a man suffer what he dîd,” and stî extract from that crude tît-for-tat a subter, hîghy dîversîied notîon of re-quîta. The more nuanced notîon wî be appîcabe în commerce; but ît îs aso generaîzabe to themes of proportîon where equaîty of varîous kînds preserves the sense of equîty that Arîstote inds adumbrated în tempes to the Graces. The mutîfaceted concept he extracts inds îts artîcuacy în con-text, from the aw courts to the tennîs courts, and from works of ictîon and crîtîcîsm to reatîons of întîmacy and understandîng. Passed through Arîstote’s conceptua prîsm, equîty îs refracted înto a îts dîverse coors and recom-bîned înto a sînge îdea crîtîca to the foundatîon of any sound poîty or socîety. For the kerne of truth that Arîstote inds în the Pythagorean dîc-tum, through hîs habîtua practîce of “savîng the appearances,” not ony vîsuay but în the outooks of others, îs that justîce demands a kînd of equîty wîthout whîch human beîngs “woud thînk theîr posîtîon mere savery” (Nîcomachean Ethîcs 1133a7). The îdea of savery îs a irm pîvot poînt for much of Arîstote’s poîtîca thînkîng, not because he assumes that savery îs aways wrong but because he
I NTRODUCTION
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knows that no one gîven the freedom to choose woud opt to be a save. Savery, as Arîstote deines ît, îs the use of a human beîng as another’s too. It îs, în that sense, the utîmate vîoatîon of the Kantîan împeratîve never to subjugate another to the status of a mere means to an end. We human beîngs, for Arîstote, fui and exercîse our human nature when we are choosers of our own ends. Saves, as a condîtîon of theîr servîtude, cannot do that. They have uses, not ends of theîr own, and those uses are împosed. That Arîstote faîed to ind a way of îberatîng humanîty from the trammes of savery wîthout osîng the opportunîty for fuiment that he hed so precîous for the free matters ess today phîosophîcay than does hîs abîîty to pînpoînt just what ît îs that makes savery repugnant and unacceptabe. The standard he învokes but faîs to appy reaches far beyond the bare demand for emancîpatîon. For ît artîcuates the basîs for condemnîng and combatîng a forms of învîdîous expoîtatîon and abuse, from human trafickîng and sweat-shop abor to meretrîcîous sexuaîty and envîronmenta poîsonîng. It’s fashîonabe today to dîsparage the îdea of human nature. The notîon that one can derîve mora standards or poîtîca norms from a study of the human specîes and human personhood îs vîewed wîth suspîcîon, îf not aarm. Not ony do such efforts breach Hume’s barrîer betweenîsandoughtbut they seem to threaten the very fabrîc of dîversîty—ethnîc, cutura, and mora— that îs wîdey seen as the chîef and rîpest fruît of democracy, burstîng wîth the seeds of a postîbera dîspensatîon. Dîversîty, of course, îs precîous, and not east for what ît brîngs to and draws from the îdea of îberty. But human dîversîty does have îmîts, and îf prescrîptîve judgments and practîca îm-peratîves do foow from the recognîtîon that there are ony certaîn thîngs a human beîng can stand and ony certaîn thîngs that any human beîng shoud be asked to put up wîth (beîng ordered to the back of the bus or reegated to a racîay segregated schoo never among them), then we must recognîze a common core of humanness that deserves respect and demands dîgnîty; and we must acknowedge that the egîtîmate dîstînctîon between factîcîty and rîghtness does not precude the recognîtîon that there are facts about vaues and that the human person, qua human, îs a ocus of învîoabe deserts—and obîgatîons. Some of what Arîstote has to te us about poîtîcs comes în the form of sîmpe home truths that mîght sound îke cîches when speed out and mîght seem too obvîous to need statîng and yet, eementary as they are, have often been forgotten, quîte often wîfuy and wîth dangerous or tragîc con-sequences. Sometîmes an îdea îke Arîsote’s caîm that man îs azoon polîtîkon—that îs, a socîa anîma, a cîvîc beîng—sounds so famîîar and ooks so transparent on the page that we readîy ose track of how rîchy ied wîth împîcatîons these seemîngy sîmpe words can be. Readîng în Arîstote that habît îssecond nature or that a frîend îs a second sef, one rîsks osîng sîght atogether of the fu meanîng of the words and sîps unsefconscîousy înto the mode of the feow who saîd “What’s so great about Shakespeare? It’s just
