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In Zion's Dilemmas, a former deputy national security adviser to the State of Israel details the history and, in many cases, the chronic inadequacies in the making of Israeli national security policy. Chuck Freilich identifies profound, ongoing problems that he ascribes to a series of factors: a hostile and highly volatile regional environment, Israel's proportional representation electoral system, and structural peculiarities of the Israeli government and bureaucracy.Freilich uses his insider understanding and substantial archival and interview research to describe how Israel has made strategic decisions and to present a first of its kind model of national security decision-making in Israel. He analyzes the major events of the last thirty years, from Camp David I to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, through Camp David II, the Gaza Disengagement Plan of 2005, and the second Lebanon war of 2006.In these and other cases he identifies opportunities forgone, failures that resulted from a flawed decision-making process, and the entanglement of Israeli leaders in an inconsistent, highly politicized, and sometimes improvisational planning process. The cabinet is dysfunctional and Israel does not have an effective statutory forum for its decision-making-most of which is thus conducted in informal settings. In many cases policy objectives and options are poorly formulated. For all these problems, however, the Israeli decision-making process does have some strengths, among them the ability to make rapid and flexible responses, generally pragmatic decision-making, effective planning within the defense establishment, and the skills and motivation of those involved. Freilich concludes with cogent and timely recommendations for reform.
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Date de parution

28 septembre 2012

EAN13

9780801465741

Langue

English

Poids de l'ouvrage

1 Mo

Zion’s Dilemmas
a volume in the series
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt
A list of titles in this series is available at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
Zion’s Dilemmas
How Israel Makes National Security Policy
C h a r l e s D . F r e i l i c h
Cornell University Press Ithaca and London
Copyright © 2012 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 2012 by Cornell University Press
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data
Freilich, Charles D. (Charles David)  Zion’s dilemmas : how Israel makes national security policy / Charles D. Freilich.  p. cm.—(Cornell studies in security affairs)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 9780801451041 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. National security—Israel—Decision making. 2. Israel—Politics and government. 3. Israel—Military policy. 4. Israel—Foreign relations. I. Title. II. Series: Cornell studies in security affairs.  UA853.I8F73 2013  355'.03355694—dc23  2012019706
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetablebased, lowVOC inks and acidfree papers that are recycled, totally chlorinefree, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
Cloth printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To Lior and Tal, in the fervent hope that their children, or at least grandchildren, may know peace and no longer have to bear arms in Israel’s defense
Contents
Prefacea ndA cknowledgments Acronyms Dramatis Personae
Introduction
PART I. THE SETTING 1. Constraints and Players:The External Environment, Proportional Representation System, and National Security EstablishmentIsrael’s National Security Environment TheP roportionalRe presentationSyst em The National Security Establishment 2. TheD ecisionMakingP rocess:How the System Actually WorksPathology 1: An Unplanned Process Pathology 2: A Highly Politicized Process Pathology 3: Semiorganized Anarchy; or, Is Anyone at the Helm? Pathology 4: An Uninstitutionalized Process Pathology 5: Primacy of the Defense Establishment Something Must Be Good: Strengths of the Israeli System
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ix xiii xv
1
9
11 12 16 19
27 27 37 43 52 60 71
CONTENTS
PART II. THE CASE STUDIES 3. Camp David I:Making Peace with Egypt, 1977–19794. The Makings of a Young Lion:The Lavi Combat Aircraft,1980–1987
5.6.7.
8.9.
The Invasion of Lebanon, 1982
Leaving Lebanon:The Unilateral Withdrawal, 2000
Camp David II:The IsraeliPalestinian Negotiations, 1999–2000
Disengaging from Gaza, 2005
Back Again:The Second Lebanon War, 2006
PART III. FINAL THOUGHTS  Conclusions and Recommendations The Case Studies in Comparative Perspective Key Findings Past Attempts at Reform Failings Tolerable No Longer Future Reforms
Appendix 1: The INSC Law, 2008 Appendix 2: Recommendations of the Winograd Commission and the Shahak Committee List of Interviews Notes Bibliography Index
viii
75 79 100
122 141
154 177 199
223 225 225 231 234 243 246
259
261 267 269 295 309
Preface and Acknowledgments
Israel’s history, its travails and accomplishments, especially in the area of national security, have been a lifelong passion. Having been born in the United States in the post–World War II era, following the Holocaust, I have always felt extraordinarily privileged to have been able to enjoy the mag nificent freedoms and opportunities America affords and for which I bear an unabashed reverence. But for a geographic accident of birth, neither my family nor I might have been alive to share these blessings. After the Jewish people’s twothousandyear saga of exile, persecution, and achievement, I have always felt especially fortunate to have been born shortly after Israel’s rebirth and that it was important that I make my life in Israel, participate in some small way in its stormy and dramatic history, and enjoy the freedoms and opportunities it, too, affords. As such, this is a work of love, embedded in a lifelong commitment to Zionism, along with deeply felt frustration over Israel’s shortcomings and failings, which I have long observed as a citizen, soldier, civil servant, and now scholar. This book is not part of the “revisionist history” popular in recent years among some Israeli scholars, whose often highly biased at tempts to redress the biases of some of their predecessors have added little to our objective understanding of the Israeli experience. It is an attempt to describe Israel’s national security decisionmaking processes as they truly are. I wish that the picture presented could have been far more positive and laudatory. I would have greatly preferred to extol than to criticize, but only a cold, unforgiving, and “objective” analysis, to the extent that I am capable of it, does justice to the importance of the subject and as such truly serves Israel’s cause.
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