Why Containment Works , livre ebook
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2020
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240
pages
English
Ebooks
2020
Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne En savoir plus
Publié par
Date de parution
15 novembre 2020
EAN13
9781501749506
Langue
English
Poids de l'ouvrage
2 Mo
Why Containment Works examines the conduct of American foreign policy during and after the Cold War through the lens of applied policy analysis. Wallace J. Thies argues that the Bush Doctrine after 2002 was a theory of victory-a coherent strategic view that tells a state how best to transform scarce resources into useful military assets, and how to employ those assets in conflicts. He contrasts prescriptions derived from the Bush Doctrine with an alternative theory of victory, one based on containment and deterrence, which US presidents employed for much of the Cold War period. There are, he suggests, multiple reasons for believing that containment was working well against Saddam Hussein's Iraq after the first Gulf War and that there was no need to invade Iraq in 2003.Thies reexamines five cases of containment drawn from the Cold War and the post-Cold War world. Each example, Thies suggests, offered US officials a choice between reliance on traditional notions of containment and reliance on a more forceful approach. To what extent did reliance on rival theories of victory-containment versus first strike-contribute to a successful outcome? Might these cases have been resolved more quickly, at lower cost, and more favorably to American interests if US officials had chosen a different mix of the coercive and deterrent tools available to them? Thies suggests that the conventional wisdom about containment was often wrong: a superpower like the United States has such vast resources at its disposal that it could easily thwart Libya, Iraq, and Iran by means other than open war.
Voir
Publié par
Date de parution
15 novembre 2020
EAN13
9781501749506
Langue
English
Poids de l'ouvrage
2 Mo
WhyContainmentWorks
a volum e in th e series
CornellStudiesinSecurityAffairs
EditedbyRobertJ.Art,RobertJervis,andStephenM.Walt
Alistoftitlesinthisseriesisavailableatcornellpress.cornell.edu.
WhyContainment Works
Power,Proliferation,andPreventive War
Wa l l a c e J . Th i e s
CornellUniversityPressIthacaandLondon
Copyright © 2020 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book,
or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without
permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address
Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca,
New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu.
First published 2020 by Cornell University Press
Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data
Names: Thies, Wallace J., author.
Title: Why containment works : power, proliferation, and preventive
war / Wallace J. Thies.
Description: Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2020. |
Series: Cornell studies in security affairs | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identiers: LCCN 2020022151 (print) | LCCN 2020022152 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781501749483 (cloth) | ISBN 9781501749490 (epub) |
ISBN 9781501749506 (pdf)
Subjects: LCSH: Balance of power. | Deterrence (Strategy) |
United StatesForeign relationsPhilosophy. | LibyaForeign
relationsUnited States. | IraqForeign relations
United States. | IranForeign relationsUnited States.
Classication: LCC JZ1313 .T45 2020 (print) | LCC JZ1313 (ebook) |
DDC 956.7044/31dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020022151
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020022152
Cover image: USS Ronald Reagan with aircraft from Carrier Air
Wing Five, South China Sea, October 19, 2019. US Navy photo.
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.
Contents
Preface
Preventive War and ContainmentContaining Qaddas LibyaDual Containment of Iraq and IranContaining IraqInvading Iraq
Containing Iran
Containment Reappraised
NotesIndex
v
vii
1 20 55 87 119 150 174
195 221
Preface
Thesubjectofthisbookisthestrategyofcontainment,andwhy,undertheproper conditions, it can serve as a viable alternative to the strategy of pre ventive war. AsIdeneit,containmentisnotapassivestrategy,norisitonethatnec essarily seeks regime change in a targeted state, although it often does. Nor is it one that seeks to prevent the target from doing anything and every thing. Containment assumes that hostility exists between the container and the target, and so the strategy should be seen as a form of managed conict that seeks to prevent the target state from overturning the local, regional, or global distribution of power. Containment aims for eventual victory over the targeted state, but it will settle for stalemate for a long, long time if necessary. Containment does not have to be practiced everywhere that two states interests bump up against each other. Instead, a state engaging in a containment strategy seeks to thwart, deny, or prevent the target state from doing only those things that the container would nd dan gerous and unacceptable. The criterion for judging whether a containment policy has succeeded is not whether the target state continues to put up resistance, but whether the target has actually achieved anything that the container opposes. Seeninthislight,containmentistheobverseofthestrategyofpreventivewar. Those who hold to the latter strategy see war as inevitable down the road, believe that at that point the balance of forces between the container and the target will be unfavorable for the former, and therefore that action sooner is better than action later. Unlike containment, preventive war is an impatient strategy, one that sees a need to act quickly lest the threat grow too large to handle successfully. A containment strategy believes that the
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PREFACE
restraints imposed on the targeted state, and any additional ones added in the future, are sufcient to hold it in check. A preventive war strategy, to the contrary, believes that only a swift, decisive war can remove the threat. Prompt eradication of the threat versus patiently holding it in checkthis is the crucial distinction between the two strategies. InthisbookIdonotclaimthatcontainmentshouldalwaysbethepre ferred strategy when a state confronts another state that poses a threat. There may well be instances when preventive war makes more sense, although I personally believe that those instances are rare. Instead, what I claim is that, when seen in historical perspective, containment has been a remarkably successful strategy for the United States. In the cases I examine containment worked in the sense that I earlier dened success. If the goal of this book is not to demonstrate that containment is a strategy for all seasons, then what is its purpose? Simply put, to show that under the proper circumstances containment can workbecause it has worked.It should therefore be considered a viable alternative and taken seriously as such when the United States once again, as it inevitably will, contemplates pre ventive war. In short, I examine cases where containment succeeded in order to locate those factors that made it work and that can enable it to work again should the need arise. Iproceedasfollows.Inchapter1,IrecasttheBushDoctrineasatheory of victory, that is, a coherent strategic view that tells a state how best to trans form the scarce resources available to it into useful military assets, and how to employ those assets in conicts with other states or nonstate actors. I then compare and contrast these prescriptions derived from the Bush Doc trine with an alternative theory of victorynamely, one based on contain ment and deterrence. I argue that there were multiple convincing reasons for believing that the combination of containment and deterrence was workingindeed, working very wellagainst Saddam Husseins Iraq as of 2002 and 2003, and thus there was no need to invade Iraq, certainly not in 2003 and probably not for years to come. HavingintroducedthesetworivaltheoriesofvictoryonebasedontheBush Doctrine, the other on traditional notions of containment and deterrenceI then reexamine, in chapters 2 through 6, ve cases of contain ment drawn from the Cold War and the postCold War world. The Cold War cases include containing Libya and the dual containment of Iraq and Iran. The postCold War cases include containing Iraq, invading Iraq, and containing Iran. I picked these ve cases because they each offered US of cials a choice between reliance on traditional notions of containment and deterrence and reliance on a more forceful approach akin to the Bush Doc trine. For each of these ve cases, I explore the extent to which reliance on these rival theories of victorycontainment and deterrence versus striking rstcontributed to a successful resolution of the issues at stake. I also pose a counterfactual question: Would these cases have been resolved more
viii
PREFACE
quickly, at less cost, and in a manner more favorable to American interests if US ofcials had chosen a different mix of the coercive and deterrent tools available to them? In chapter 7, I review the relative merits of these two theories of victory based on evidence drawn from my ve case studies and the Cold War too. I also assess the new knowledge made possible by com paring and contrasting these two alternative theories of victory.
Acknowledgments
Anauthorwhoundertakesaprojectofthissizeandscopeinevitablyincursdebts to numerous individuals. Several colleagues took it upon themselves to read some or even all of the manuscript. Before the manuscript was sub mitted to a publisher, Mark Randol read it cover to cover and offered numerous suggestions and lots of encouragement, which was greatly appreciated. Robert Art and Roger Haydon reviewed the manuscript on behalf of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs program. Robert and Roger went above and beyond their duties as editors and reviewers to bring the book to publication.Appreciationis an inadequate word to express my debt to them for their contributions. Robert Jervis and Stephen Walt likewise evaluated the manuscript in their role as editors of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.
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