To Kill Nations , livre ebook

271

pages

English

Ebooks

2015

Écrit par
Edward Kaplan

Publié par
Cornell University Press

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271

pages

English

Ebooks

2015

Lire un extrait

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne En savoir plus

Publié par

Cornell University Press

Date de parution

11 août 2015

Nombre de lectures

EAN13

9780801455506

Langue

English

Poids de l'ouvrage

6 Mo

"Edward Kaplan's To Kill Nations is a fascinating work that packs a thermonuclear punch of ideas and arguments... The work is suitable for anyone from advanced undergraduates to experts in the field." Strategy BridgeIn To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (19501965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy.Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.

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Publié par

Cornell University Press

Date de parution

11 août 2015

Nombre de lectures

EAN13

9780801455506

Langue

English

Poids de l'ouvrage

6 Mo

TO KILL NATIONS

TOKILLNATIONS American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction

Edward Kaplan

CORNELL UNIVERSITY ITHACA AND LONDON

Contents

Preface

Introduction: Prevail 1. Antecedents 2. Declaration, Action, and the Air-Atomic Strategy 3. Finding a Place 4. The Fantastic Compression of Time 5. To Kill a Nation 6. Stalemate, Finite Deterrence, Polaris, and SIOP-62 7. New Sheriff in Town 8. End of an Era Conclusion: Survive

Key to Sources and Abbreviations Notes Index

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225 229 253

Preface

I became interested in the paradoxes of nuclear strategy during the early 1980s. To a high school student keenly interested in history, news reports of the SS-20 and Pershing II missile deployments in Europe created fascination about a weapon whose existence deterred its use. The two world wars of the twentieth century were ﬁlled with technological advances used without restraint. How did nuclear weapons come to be not only unused but unusable? My interest received a new twist a decade later. In the mid-1990s, the US Air Force (USAF) began the Aerospace Basic Course, which, like the Marine Corps program that inspired it, trained new lieutenants in the fundamentals of the Air Force mission and indoc-trinated them into their service. I wondered: Why, with ﬁfty years of Air Force heritage to call on, did we choose to ape Marine Corps methods for forging ser-vice identity? The answer seems clear: from their ﬁrst days in uniform, Marines embody their mission and identity. Early Air Force history shows self-conﬁdence, deﬁned by strategic bombing. What happened to that clear sense of mission? As an ofﬁcer and an instructor at the Air Force Academy charged with introducing cadets to military history and their service, these questions became important personally and professionally. Reﬂection on cultural images deepened my disquiet. Iconic images of World War II instantly recognizable to the public appear in American history books. The ﬂag raising at Iwo Jima is synonymous with the Marine Corps. The mush-room cloud over Nagasaki is equally iconic, but produces unease. Where the Marines chose that ﬂag raising as their memorial for World War II, the Air Force avoided its most recognizable image, instead opting for an abstract sculpture which suggests the missing man formation. One service is at home with its past while the other avoids it. Movies reﬂect the absence of a clear USAF self-image. Immediately following the Second World War, Hollywood mirrored the public’s comfort with the armed services.To Hell and Back(1955),Patton(1970), andSaving Private Ryan(1998) embody an all-conquering US Army led by a charismatic general and everyday GIs struggling to survive and return.Sands of Iwo Jima(1949),A Few Good Men(1992), andFlags of Our Fathers(2006) promote the Marines. The Navy is well represented by such ﬁlms asThe Caine Mutiny(1954),The Hunt for Red October(1990), and evenTop Gun(1986). Pro–Air Force images were common in ﬁlms through the early 1960s—Twelve O’Clock High(1949),Strategic Air Command

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(1955), andA Gathering of Eagles(1963) come to mind. However, by and after the middle of that decade, the Air Force is parodied unintentionally in movies like Iron Eagle(1986) and intentionally inDr. Strangelove(1964). This last movie illuminates the fate of Air Force identity. Those early movies depict a service deﬁned by strategic bombing in the nuclear age and comfortable in that role. They are almost unknown now. While the Navy could use F-14s buzzing the tower inTop Gunin a recruiting commercial today, Jimmy Stewart looking skyward at a B-36 is only a curiosity for a ﬁlm class. Dr. Strangelove, though, is a classic. Its characters, frightening and absurd, mock public ﬁgures like Herman Kahn and Curtis LeMay. What makes the story line bizarre, and characters like General Buck Turgidson laughable and terrify-ing, is its contrast with the conviction of the director and his audience that nu-clear war cannot be won. We know this fact. The characters do not. Why is Tur-gidson funny and frightening? Was he, and the USAF with him, always so out of step with reality, or had something changed between 1945 and 1964? The answer is deﬁnitively that somethinghadchanged: the American understanding of and preparation for nuclear war. Addressing so large a topic was not something I could do on my own. First, and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, John Ferris, as well as Holger Herwig, Stephen Randall, and James Keeley for their counsel and guidance. Hew Strachan generously reviewed the ﬁnal work and provided essential guidance. I must thank Colonel Mark Wells for giving me the opportunity to seek graduate education and to return to the classroom at the Air Force Academy. Any historian learns to praise dedicated archivists. I had the great fortune of meeting many professionals during my research. Finally, thanks to my wife, Leigh, and to my parents, whose encouragement always was freely given and warmly welcomed.

The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not reﬂect the ofﬁcial policy or position of the US Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US government.

TO KILL NATIONS

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