A Gallant Defense , livre ebook

A G ALLANT D EFENSE
A G ALLANT D EFENSE
T HE S IEGE OF C HARLESTON , 1780
C ARL P. B ORICK
© 2003 University of South Carolina
Cloth edition published by the University of South Carolina Press, 2003
Paperback edition published by the University of South Carolina Press, 2012
Ebook edition published in Columbia, South Carolina,
by the University of South Carolina Press, 2012
www.sc.edu/uscpress
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The Library of Congress has cataloged the cloth edition as follows
Borick, Carl P., 1966–
A gallant defense : the Siege of Charleston, 1780 / Carl P. Borick.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-57003-487-7 (alk. paper)
1. Charleston (S.C.) History Siege, 1780. I. Title.
E241.C4 B67 2003
973.3'36 dc21 2002013378
ISBN 978-1-61117-168-6 (ebook)
In memory of the hundreds of American, British, and Hessian soldiers who lie in unmarked graves throughout the South Carolina lowcountry
C ONTENTS
List of Illustrations
Preface
Acknowledgments
Chapter One Early Threats
Chapter Two A “Very Essential Business” Begins
Chapter Three Reaction North and South
Chapter Four The British on the Sea Islands
Chapter Five That Infernal Bar
Chapter Six The Defenders of Charleston
Chapter Seven Across the Ashley
Chapter Eight Siege Warfare
Chapter Nine Breaking Ground: The Siege Begins
Chapter Ten The Cooper River Communication
Chapter Eleven The Noose Tightens on Charleston Neck
Chapter Twelve Investiture
Chapter Thirteen A Gallant Defense
Chapter Fourteen Appearances in This Province Are Certainly Very Favourable
Appendix A Articles of Capitulation as proposed by Benjamin Lincoln and as finalized by Sir Henry Clinton and Marriot Arbuthnot
Appendix B British and American Forces in the Siege of Charleston as of 30 April 1780
Notes
Bibliography
Index
I LLUSTRATIONS
Maps
Sea Islands South and West of Charleston
Charleston Bar and Harbor
American Defenses
Region East of the Cooper
British Parallels and Approaches
Figures following page 160
The View of Charles Town
Benjamin Lincoln
General William Moultrie
Sir Henry Clinton
Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot
Commodore Abraham Whipple
Lachlan McIntosh
William Washington
Charles Cornwallis, first Marquess Cornwallis
Colonel Banastre Tarleton
Jaegers Corps
Siege of Charleston
P REFACE
On the afternoon of 26 December 1779, from his post in the hills of eastern New Jersey, Brigadier General Anthony Wayne of the Continental line watched through his spyglass as an immense fleet of British ships cleared Sandy Hook and then disappeared below the horizon. Wayne counted 106 vessels in the fleet; it was one of the largest that the British had assembled in almost five years of war. Although he could only conjecture on the number of troops onboard, the transports of the fleet in actuality contained over seven thousand British and Hessian troops led by Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, the commander in chief of British armies in America. While Wayne could not determine the size of the land force, nor could he know for sure who commanded them, one thing was certain: this armada was not embarking on a raid or small-scale operation. Clearly something more ominous was in store for the Americans. New York, from where the British fleet sailed, and New Jersey, from where Anthony Wayne observed their departure, had been the primary seat of war for the previous three and a half years. But the ships disappearing into the Atlantic signaled a sea change in British strategy, one that would embroil them in an attempt to suppress the rebellion in the south and that would eventually lead them to Yorktown and the loss of America.
The destination of the British force was Charleston, South Carolina. British military and political leaders asserted that the capture of Charles Town (the city did not become Charleston until its incorporation in 1783) would not only strike a blow at the rebels by occupying the most important city and port in the southern colonies, but would also provide a springboard from which they could subjugate the entire south. Underlying the commitment to this new southern strategy was the notion that multitudes of loyalists in the southern colonies would throw off the yoke their rebellious and tyrannical neighbors had imposed upon them and rush to the assistance of their liberators. British commanders anticipated that swarms of able-bodied loyalists would help them secure and maintain the peace for the Crown.
This work is about the British campaign against Charleston and the American response to that campaign. Traditionally, historians have referred to the siege of Charleston as a single event without recognizing that the British attempt to take Charleston and the army defending it was a campaign, one which consumed several months and ranged over fifty miles of the South Carolina lowcountry. It is a campaign that historians have underappreciated, often relegating it to a chapter or less in general accounts of the war in the south. Other than William Thomas Bulger’s 1957 University of Michigan dissertation, no other thorough examination of the subject has ever been proffered. The siege of Charleston was one of the critical points in the military history of the American Revolution, and it deserves greater attention. Not only was it the longest formal siege of the American Revolution, but also it was the largest single British effort in South Carolina. Moreover, British operations against Charleston in 1780 launched their attempt to end the rebellion by subjugating the southern colonies, an effort which succeeded at the outset but which ultimately ended in disaster. A study of the Charleston campaign highlights the many difficulties that the Americans faced in attempting to survive as a new nation and that the British encountered in endeavoring to subdue a rebellion in the midst of a world war. The work demonstrates how interservice cooperation on the British side and political considerations on the American could negatively influence operations and make military success uncertain. Without question, the outcome of the campaign against Charleston was uncertain for both sides until its conclusion.
This work also examines the civilian cost, underscoring the hardships that the Charleston campaign imposed on the inhabitants of the South Carolina lowcountry. While both armies had an impact on civilians, British attitudes and actions toward them which emerged during the Charleston campaign served as a harbinger of things to come. The contradiction between the policies of British officers and the conduct of British soldiers and sailors toward civilians in the course of the campaign revealed a dichotomy that ultimately made it difficult for British military leaders to win over the people of the southern states. British behavior in the South Carolina lowcountry, and later the backcountry, gave them the character of an invading army, one to be resisted rather than welcomed. This persona was to have far-reaching consequences.
Much of the story of the campaign against Charleston is told through the words of the soldiers and civilians who experienced it. Accordingly, when quoting from original manuscript sources, I have retained the idiosyncratic capitalization and spelling of their letters and journals. Eighteenth-century prose often made use of a baseline dash where a comma, semicolon, period, or question mark was appropriate. In these cases I have employed the proper punctuation. Similarly, superscript letters have been made consistent with the rest of the text.
A CKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am indebted to so many people for the completion of this work that it is impossible to list them all. I should begin with the staff of the Charleston Museum. If it were not for that institution and the wonderful employees there, I probably would not have been able to write this book. Brien Varnado, the museum’s former assistant director, encouraged me on this project from day one. So many times when I became frustrated with research or writing, he was there to prod me to continue on. Although not a military historian, he showed enthusiasm and interest in the topic throughout our discussions of it. John Brumgardt, director of the Charleston Museum, also provided encouragement and vigorously promoted the manuscript to board members and museum patrons. I thank the Board of Trustees for their support of both the Charleston Museum and my book.
Sharon Bennett and Julia Logan of the Charleston Museum Archives helped me to locate endless documents, illustrations, and maps at other institutions. Other staff continuously asked how things were coming along. To have worked at the Charleston Museum, which is only a few hundred feet from where many of the major events of the siege took place, at the same time that I was composing the manuscript was inspiration in itself.
Lawrence F. Kohl at the University of Alabama was also influential in the publication of this book. He kindly read the first draft and offered many useful suggestions to improve it. He was an excellent mentor when I was in graduate school and is now a good friend.
I am equally indebted to other reviewers. Don Higginbotham, whose work I have always admired, also agreed to read the manuscript. His favorable opinion helped move the project along at a critical point. I must also thank the reviewers who read the manuscript for USC Press. Their suggestions and comments vastly enhanced it. In addition, I need to mention