How to Prevent Coups d'Etat , livre ebook

216

pages

English

Ebooks

2020

Écrit par
De Bruin Erica

Publié par
Cornell University Press

Lire un extrait

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne En savoir plus

Découvre YouScribe et accède à tout notre catalogue !

Je m'inscris

Découvre YouScribe et accède à tout notre catalogue !

Je m'inscris

216

pages

English

Ebooks

2020

Lire un extrait

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne En savoir plus

Publié par

Cornell University Press

Date de parution

15 novembre 2020

EAN13

9781501751936

Langue

English

Poids de l'ouvrage

4 Mo

In this lively and provocative book, Erica De Bruin looks at the threats that rulers face from their own armed forces. Can they make their regimes impervious to coups?How to Prevent Coups d'Etat shows that how leaders organize their coercive institutions has a profound effect on the survival of their regimes. When rulers use presidential guards, militarized police, and militia to counterbalance the regular military, efforts to oust them from power via coups d'etat are less likely to succeed. Even as counterbalancing helps to prevent successful interventions, however, the resentment that it generates within the regular military can provoke new coup attempts. And because counterbalancing changes how soldiers and police perceive the costs and benefits of a successful overthrow, it can create incentives for protracted fighting that result in the escalation of a coup into full-blown civil war.Drawing on an original dataset of state security forces in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, De Bruin sheds light on how counterbalancing affects regime survival. Understanding the dynamics of counterbalancing, she shows, can help analysts predict when coups will occur, whether they will succeed, and how violent they are likely to be. The arguments and evidence in this book suggest that while counterbalancing may prevent successful coups, it is a risky strategy to pursue-and one that may weaken regimes in the long term.

Voir

Publié par

Cornell University Press

Date de parution

15 novembre 2020

EAN13

9781501751936

Langue

English

Poids de l'ouvrage

4 Mo

Central

HOW TO PREVENT COUPS D’ÉTAT

HOW TO PREVENT COUPS D’ÉTAT Counterbalancing and Regime Survival

ErICà De BrUIn

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESSNODDNANOLITHACA

Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges receipt of a grant from The Foreman Fund at Hamilton College, which aided in the publication of this book.

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu.

First published 2020 by Cornell University Press

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data

Names: De Bruin, Erica, 1982– author. Title: How to prevent coups d’état : counterbalancing and regime survival / Erica De Bruin. Description: Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identiﬁers: LCCN 2020005767 (print) | LCCN 2020005768 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501751912 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781501751929 (epub) | ISBN 9781501751936 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Coups d’état—Prevention. | Civil war—Prevention. | Balance of power. | Political leadership. | Political stability. | Military policy. | Civilmilitary relations. | National security. Classiﬁcation: LCC JC494 .D43 2020 (print) | LCC JC494 (ebook) | DDC 321.09—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020005767 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020005768

For Sam

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgments

Introduction: Preventing Coups d’État 1. The Logic of Counterbalancing 2. Counterbalancing and Coup Failure 3. How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms 4. An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts 5. Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions 6. How Coups d’État Escalate to Civil War Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival

Appendix Notes Index

îx xî

115

131

141 155 193

TablesandFîgures

Tables 1.1. Causal mechanisms linking counterbalancing to coup failure 20 1.2. Causal mechanisms linking counterbalancing to the incidence of coup attempts 27 2.1. States included in the statistical analysis 41 2.2. Cross tabulation of coup outcomes and counterbalancing 48 2.3. Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables (coup outcomes) 50 2.4. Coup success: Logit results 52 2.5. Correlations: Coup success, counterbalancing, and military strength 54 3.1. Evidence on causal mechanisms during sixteen coup attempts 70 4.1. Cross tabulation of coup attempts and counterbalancing 81 4.2. Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables (coup attempts) 83 4.3. Coup attempts: Logit results 84 4.4. Coup attempts: Survival analysis 88 4.5. Correlations: Coup attempts, new counterweights, and military strength 91 5.1. Summary of case outcomes: New counterweights and coup attempts 94 5.2. The context of counterweight creation in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Cuba 95 5.3. Comparing coupprooﬁng strategies and forms of counterbalancing 112 5.4. Coup attempts: Logit results with forms of counterbalancing disaggregated 113 6.1. Summary of case outcomes: Counterbalancing and the escalation of coups to civil war 116 A.1. Coup attempts included in the statistical analysis 141

Voir