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Beyssade C. 14/02/07 Site du séminaire : linguist.jussieu.fr/∼marandin INTERFACE ILLOCUTION, SYNTAXE ET PROSODIE Sémantique illocutoire : état de l'art I LES ACTES DE LANGAGE : BREF HISTORIQUE asserter ≠ énoncer Frege (1918) : assertoric force (‘Behauptende Kraft’) of the utterance. Austin (1975) : - the locutionary act - the illocutionary act Illocutionary acts are such acts as asserting, asking a question, warning, threatening, announcing a verdict or intention, making an appointment, giving an order, expressing a wish, making a request. An utterance of a sentence, i.e. a locutionary act, by means of which a question is asked is thus an utterance with interrogative force, and when an assertion is made the utterance has assertoric force. Each type of illocutionary act is a type of act with the corresponding illocutionary force. - the perlocutionary act. The perlocutionary act is made by means of an illocutionary act, and depends entirely on the hearer's reaction. For instance, by means of arguing the speaker may convince the hearer, and by means of warning the speaker may frighten the hearer. In these examples, convincing and frightening are perlocutionary acts. • Quelle place donner à la réaction de l'interlocuteur dans la théorie des actes de langage ? For instance, I haven't warned someone unless he heard and understood what I said. In this sense the performance of an illocutionary act depends on the ‘securing of uptake’ (Austin ...
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Beyssade C. 14/02/07 Site du séminaire : linguist.jussieu.fr/∼marandin INTERFACE ILLOCUTION,SYNTAXE ET PROSODIESémantique illocutoire : état de l'art I LES ACTES DE LANGAGE:BREF HISTORIQUEasserter≠énoncer Frege(1918) : assertoric force (‘Behauptende Kraft) of the utterance. Austin(1975) : - the locutionary act - the illocutionary actIllocutionary acts are such acts as asserting, asking a question, warning, threatening, announcing a verdict or intention, making an appointment, giving an order, expressing a wish, making a request. An utterance of a sentence, i.e. a locutionary act, by means of which a question is asked is thus an utterance with interrogative force, and when an assertion is made the utterance has assertoric force. Each type of illocutionary act is a type of act with the corresponding illocutionary force. - the perlocutionary act. The perlocutionary act is made by means of an illocutionary act, and depends entirely on the hearer's reaction. For instance, by means of arguing the speaker may convince the hearer, and by means of warning the speaker may frighten the hearer. In these examples, convincing and
frightening are perlocutionary acts. • Quelle place donner à la réaction de l'interlocuteur dans la théorie des actes de langage ? For instance, I haven't warned someone unless he heard and understood what I said.In this sense the performance of an illocutionary act depends on the ‘securing of uptake (Austin 1975, 117).Philosophie du langage : élaborer une taxinomie des actes de langages.
• Austin (1956): constativevsperformative utterances. Austin (1975): verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives and expositives. • Searle One leading idea, for instance in Searle's taxonomy, is to distinguish between speech acts accordingto direction of fit.An assertion has word-world direction of fit, since an assertion is correct if what is said agrees with what the world is like. By contrast, a command has a world-word direction of fit,
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since a command is satisfied if the addressee of the command subsequently performs what is ordered. • Bach and Harnich They distinguish between illocutionary types according to the type of expressed attitude. There are four top categories: constatives, directives (including questions and prohibitives), commissives (promises, offers) and acknowledgments (apologize, condole, congratulate) (1979, 41). Constatives ‘express the speaker's belief and his intention that the hearer have or form a like belief (1979, 41). • Zaefferer expressed attitude +volitional - volitional + epistemic - epistemic + exocentric - exocentric + Strong - Strong ASSERTIVES EROTETICS DIRECTIVES PERMISSIVES EXPRESSIVES
II INTERFACESYNTAXE/PRAGMATIQUE(1)2.1 The Litteral Force Hypothesis (1) Speech act = (IF, p)(2) a. (ASSERT, p)It is raining. b. (QUEST, p)Is it raining?c. (COMM, p)Let it rain! A one-to-one relationship between clause types and illocutionary forces : (3) a. The declarative type is associated with asserting. b. The interrogative type is associated with questioning. c. The imperative type is associated with requesting. d. The exclamative type is associated with exclaiming. 2.2 Les critiques (C1) "Sentences have properties by virtue of their syntax; for example they may be declarative, interrogative, subjunctive, imperative, exclamative or optative. I shall assume that these –ive properties are syntactic properties (characterized in terms of, e.g. word order, absence of subject, presence of wh-words...), and leave entirely open, for subsequent consideration, the relations these properties may or may not bear to illocutionary force. The failure to distinguish for example the syntactic property of being an interrogative from the pragmatic
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property of being a question has give rise to considerable confusion and equivocation in the recent literature" (Gazdar 1981:66) La polyfonctionalité des phrases (Gazdar 1981)Polyfunctionality = no constraint upon the uptake by Addressee (4) A.: You will go home tomorrow. How do you know?B.: a. b. Yes. c. Okay. Les actes complexes (a.o. Asher & Reese) (5) A: Would you like another drink B: Yes, thank you. Yes: réponse à la question.Thank you: réaction à l'offre. Asher and Reese (2005) : biased polar questions convey both an assertion and a question Speech act of typeassertion * question. Tests de Sadock (1974) : After allselects assertions (6) a. It is fine if you don't finish the article today. After all, your adviser is out of the country. b. # It is fine if you don't finish the article today. After all, is your adviser out of the country? By any chance or tell me select questions (7) a. # John, by any chance, owns a car. b. Does John, by any chance, own a car? (8a) is compatible with both (8) a. Has John ever voted for a democrat? b. After all, has John ever voted for a democrat? c. Has John by any chance ever voted for a democrat? d. After all, has John by any chance ever voted for a democrat?Asher and Reese'sproposal could be extended to confirmation requests. (9) a. Après tout, Marie est arrivée, n'est-ce pas ? b. Dis-moi, Marie est arrivée, n'est-ce pas ?
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c. Après tout, dis-moi, Marie est arrivée, n'est-ce pas ? Mais attention :d'autres tests de même type montrent que les questions polaires biaisées et les demandes de confirmation doivent être distinguées. (10) a. # Marie est-elle (jamais) venue, nest-ce pas ? b. Marie est venue, nest-ce pas ? III LA SEMANTIQUE:ENTRE SYNTAXE ET PRAGMATIQUE3.1 Distinguer contenu et contenu propositionnel • Quelle différence de contenu propositionnel entre question totale et partielle ? (11) a. Will somebody eat some cookies? somebody :∃x ( human(x)∧....) some cookies :∃y (cookies(y)∧....) b.∃x∃y (human(x)∧cookies(y)∧will-eat (x,y))(12) a. Who will eat some cookies? some cookies :∃y (cookies(y)∧....) who: x∧human(x) + existential cloture b.∃x∃y ( human(x)∧cookies(y)∧will-eat (x,y)) (13) (QUEST,∃x∃y ( human(x)∧cookies(y)∧will-eat (x,y)) • Suffit-il de poser des opérateurs illocutoires différents pour question totale et partielle (QUEST-wh≠QUEST) ? (14)Who ate something? a. b. What did someone eat? c. Who ate what? d. (QUEST-wh,∃x∃y (human(x)∧ate (x,y))) (C2) "There's a straightforward way out of this problem. Instead of treating speech act assignements as pairs consisting of an illocutionay force and a propositional content, we treat them as pairs consisting of an illocutionary force and a content, where the set of contents is identified with the set of sentence meanings." (Gazdar, 1981:68) ⇒(14)a, b et c ont des contenus distincts et la même force illocutoire. 4
3.2 Les différentes propositions sémantiques a) En introduisant des types complexes (Asher, Asher et Reese). Mais ce sont des types de quoi ? des types syntaxiques, sémantiques, pragmatiques ? b) Ginzburg & Sag (2000) propose a rich ontology,they develop their ontology in the framework of situation theory. SOAs contributes what is common to different structured objects. For example, utterances in (2) share the same content;this content is not the proposition that it rains but the description of a situation where it rains(cf Ginzburg & Sag, 2000: 84). It comprises, along with basic objects (individuals, times, situations, relations), structured objects whose properties are obtained compositionally. The basic structured object is the SOA; it enters the composition of all other structured objects: Propositions and also Questions (i. e. propositional abstracts), Possibilities (among them Facts) and Outcomes. (15) a.Will somebody eat some cookies? a'.λ{}.∃x∃y (human(x)∧cookies(y)∧will-eat (x,y)) b.Who will eat some cookies? b'.λx.∃y (human(x)∧cookies(y)∧will-eat (x,y)) c.What did someone eat? c'.λy.∃x (human(x)∧ate (x,y))
d.Who ate what? d'.λx,y. (human(x)∧ate (x,y)) Such an analysis says nothing of which illocutionary force is associated with the utterances in (15). More precisely, it dissociates the analysis of the semantic content from that of the illocutionary force. Pb : que fait-on avec les questions alternatives ? (16) a. Est-ce que Jean est venu ou pas ? b. Est-ce que Jean est venu ? c.λ{}. (venu (j)∨¬venu (j)) c.λ{}. venu (j)∨λ{}¬venu (j) d.λ{}. venu (j)
⇒Quelle structure pour les actes de langage ? Krifka : surement pas une algèbre de Boole. (17)a. Sors ou j'appelle la police(disjonction d'actes de langage ou menace ?) b. Je parie 5$ que s'il pleut, le match sera annulé b'. S'il pleut, je parie que la match sera annulé(conditional speech act)
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c.Quel plat chaque invité a-t-il apporté ?(quantification in question) ∀x (invité(x)) [je te demande quel plat x a apporté] pair-list reading je te demandeλy (∀x (invité(x)→(x a apporté y)) c) Krifka et la sémantique structurée • Une sémantique plus riche que la sémantique ordinaire. (18) a. Jean est beau b. B(j)sémantique classique analyse c. <λanalyse possible en sémantique structuréex B(x), j> c'. <λP P(j), B> idem (19) P = <B, F> tel que [[B(F)]] = [[P]] (C3) "The focus induced interpretation of a sentence is an ordered sequence, whose members are the property obtained by abstracting on the focus / foci, and the ordinary semantic interpretations of the focus / foci. The truth conditional content of a sentence can easily be recovered from its structured meaning." (Kadmon, date: 289) • Un format de représentation qui fait des réponses elliptique le cas normal. (19) A :Who readLa recherche du temps perdu ?λx [read (RTP)(x)] B :Mary M Question applied to answer :λx [read (RTP)(x)] . M = Read (RTP)(M) • Un format de représentation qui sapplique aussi bien aux questions quaux réponses, et qui permet de tester la congruence d'une réponse. Question polaire : (yes/no question) (20) A: Did Mary readLa recherche du temps perdu ?λf [f(read (RTP)(M))] B: NoλP[~P] Question applied to answer :λf [f(read (RTP)(M))]λP[~P] = ~Read (RTP)(M) (21)Did Mary readLa recherche du temps perdu ?
<λf [f(read (RTP)(M))], {λp[p],λp[~p]}>
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Ouietnonsont des opérateurs fonctionnels : (22)Oui:λp[p] (9)Non:λp[~p] Question wh- :<Fonction, restriction> ie association du domaine à une fonction (23) a. Who did Mary see ? <λx [see(x)(M)], Person> b. What did Mary see ? <λx [see(x)(M)], Thing> c.Who read what?<λ<x,y> [read (y) (x)], person*thing> • Alternative question Spécificité des questions alternatives : domaine des réponses possibles explicite. (24)Do you want tea or coffee ? (Question alternative) <λx [want(x)(you)], {tea, coffee}> A ne pas confondre avec (24')Do you want tea or coffee ? (Question polaire, réponse attendueouiounon, schéma accentuel diff) <λf [f[(want(tea)(you)]νwant(coffee)(you)])], {λp[p],λp[~p]}>
(25) a.Est-ce que Marie a lula recherche du temps perduou pas ?a'. <λp [p], {Read(RTP)(M), ~ Read(RTP)(M)}> b. Est-ce que Marie a lula recherche du temps perdu? b'. <λf [f[(read(RTP)(M))],{λp[p],λp[~p]}> • Différence entre questions alternatives et questions polaires (26) A :Jean veut-il du thé ou du café ?
B :* Oui / *Non. B :Du thé / Du café(27) A :Est-ce que Marie a lu la recherche du temps perdu ?B :Oui / NonB :Elle l'a lue / Elle ne l'a pas lue (27') A :Est-ce que Marie a lu la recherche du temps perdu ou pas ?B :*Oui / *NonB :(Oui), elle l'a lue / (Non), elle ne l'a pas lue
alternative
polaire
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Questions biaisées (28)Qui mieux que moi sait si ce traitement me convient ?(29)si ce n'est le curé peut le savoir ? Qui (30)a. Has John ever voted for a democrat? b. Jean a-t-il jamais voté à gauche ? c. Pourquoi se donner le moindre mal ?(31)quoi bon s'en faire ? A Biased questions: asking a question that conveys to the addressee that the questionner considers one resolution likely.
⇒introduire un ordre dans les réponses possibles. Cet ordre est-il inférable du contexte ou indiqué par l'énoncé lui-même ? Questions rhétoriques
Forme interrogative avec la force d'une assertion. Biais maximal. •Un cadre qui permet de rendre compte de la congruence d'une réponse Réactions acceptables ( réponse + réplique): - Réponses sous- ou sur-informatives, - Réponses which are natural under a contrastive topic accent », sous-informative - Acceptable replies » :I dont know,ouI wont tell you. (32)What did Mary read ? a. Mary read a novel by Balzac b. Mary read, and enjoyed, a novel by Balzacacceptable but not congruent : over informativec. Marys boyfriend read a novel by Balzacacceptable but not congruent under informative. Chgt de topicd. I dont knowno answer but replye. I wont tell you.no answer but replyf. Nice weather today.Reaction completely off the mark It is obvious how to express the condition for congruent question-answer pairs in this framework : the background of the question and the answer must be the same, and the focus of the answer must be an element of the background of the question. » (Krifka, 2001: 9).
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(33) Criterion for congruent question-answer pair Q-A , where [[Q]] = <B,R> and [[A]] = <B,F> : B=B and F∈R Exemples : deux façons de ne pas bien répondre (34) a.Who did Mary see ? <λx [See (x)(M)], Person> b.Mary saw [John]F <λx [See (x)(M)], J>, where J∈Person c.*[Mary]Fsaw John <λx [See (J)(x)], M>, where M∈Person d. *Marysaw [La recherche du temps perdu]F. <λx [See (x)(M)], RTP>, where RTP∉Person III INTERFACESYNTAXE/PRAGMATIQUE(2)- L'hypothèse performative - Son implémentation chez Ginzburg et Sag - Critiques Conclusion - La diversité des contenus - Quelle relation entre type de phrase, contenu et acte de langage ? Si on rejette la LFH, alors deux conséquences : (i) it gives us reason to think that illocutionary force has nothing to do with semantics, and should rather be handled entirely in pragmatics. (ii) la question du rapport entre type syntaxique et force illocutoire ne se pose pas seulement p dans le cas de actes de langage indirects mais aussi dans celui des actes de langage directs ou prototypiques. La question n'est plus seulement : comment se fait-il qu'une phrase interrogative puisse servir à donner des ordres (cas indirect,est-ce que tu peux me passer le sel ?) , mais déjà, comment se fait-il qu'une phrase interrogative serve à questionner? - L'importance de la notion decommitment Gazdar avait suggéré cela en parlant d'étendre la notion de commitment à des contenus non propositionnels : () "An assertion that F is a function that changes a context in which the speaker is not committed to justifiable true belief in F into a context he is so committed. A promise that F is a function that changes a context in which the speaker is not committed to bringing F about into one in which he is so committed. A permission to F is a function that changes a context in which F is prohibited into one in which F is permissible". (Gazdar, 1981) 9
- Place de la prosodie dans la grammaire et dans lanalyse des types de phrases - Importance des formes lexicales : tag, constructions etc (prochain cours) •Références :
Asher, N. and B. Reese. 2005. Negative bias in polar questions. In E. Maier, C. Bary, and J. Huitink (eds),Proceedings of SuB9,30–43. Austin, J. L., 1956. Performative Utterances, inPhilosophical Papers, 233–52, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3 edn. Austin, J. L., 1975.How to do Things with Words, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bach, K. and Harnich, R. M., 1979.Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts,Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Beyssade, C. & Marandin, J.-M. 2006. The Speech act assignement problem revisited: disentangling Speaker's commitment from Speaker's call on Addressee. In Bonami, O. & Cabredo-Hoffher (eds),Empirical Studies in Syntax and Semantics 6, pp 37-68. Frege, G., 1918. ‘Der Gedanke,Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus,100: 25–50. Reprinted in Frege 1980,Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Gazdar, G., 1981. Speech act assignment. In Joshi, Webber and Sag (eds.),Elements of Discourse Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 64-83. Ginzburg, J. & Sag, I. A., 2000.Interrogative investigations,Stanford, CSLI. Krifka, M., 2001. For a structured meaning account of questions and answers, in C. Fery & W. Sternefeld (eds.), Audiatur Vox Sapientia.A Festschrift for Arnim von Stechow, Akademie Verlag (= studia grammatica 52), Berlin, 287-319.Levinson, S., 1983.Pragmatics.Cambridge, England: Cambridge University. Portner, P., 2005. The Semantics of Imperatives within a Theory of Clause Types. In K. Watanabe and R. B. Young (eds.),Proceedings of Salt 14. Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications. Sadock, J. M., 1974.Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts, New York: Academic Press. Searle, J., 1969.Speech Acts, An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Zaefferer, D., 2001. Deconstructing a classical classification: A typological look at Searle's concept of illocution type,Revue Internationale de Philosophie2/2001. 209-225.
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