Destroying weapons of coal, air and water [Elektronische Ressource] : a critical evaluation of the American policy of German industrial demilitarization 1945 - 1952 / vorgelegt von Oliver Haller

Destroying Weapons of Coal, Air and Water: A Critical
Evaluation of the American Policy of German Industrial
Demilitarization 1945-1952




Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie
dem Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften
und Philosophie
der Philipps-Universität Marburg




vorgelegt von
Oliver Haller
aus Kitchener, Ontario, Kanada
2005 Vom Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften
und Philosophie als Dissertation angenommen am: 07. Dezember 2005

Tag der Disputation: 05. Juli 2006

Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wilfried von Bredow
Prof. Dr. Theo Schiller ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


I am grateful for the help given me by numerous persons. Like every author, I am indebted to
many librarians and especially the archivists in Bonn, Berlin, and elsewhere. The Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada helped me financially. My advisor
granted much needed assistance. But I would like to thank Claudia above all others. All
errors are my own.

December, 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................. ii

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vi

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
0.1 Opening and Thesis Statements................................................................................. 1
0.2 Historiography and Methodology.............................................................................. 4
0.3 The Interrelationship of Civilian and Military Industries....................................... 17
0.4 A Note on Sources .................................................................................................... 22

CHAPTER 1: Dual-Use Industry and Prewar Military Mobilization.................... 23
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 23
1.2 American Civilian Industry and Rearmament ........................................................ 24
1.3 German War Industries and Rearmament............................................................... 29
14 Misperceptions of Prewar German Mobilization .................................................... 37
1.5 The Failure of German Industry in War.................................................................. 43
1.6 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 48

CHAPTER 2: Strategic Bombing and Industrial Demilitarization ........................ 50
2.1 Introduction 50
2.2 Strategic Bombing Origins and the Demilitarization Panacea............................... 50
2.3 Bombing Operations in Wartime............................................................................. 56
2.4 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey and Industrial Disruption.............. 61
2.5 The Impact of Strategic Bombing on Industrial Capacities ................................... 69
2.6 Urban Bombing and the Misunderstanding of the "Wasteland" ........................... 78
2.7 Conclusion 85

CHAPTER 3: The Origins of Industrial Demilitarization........................................ 88
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 88
3.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Policies and the German Future...................................... 88
3.3 The Hard Soviet Peace and German Pastoralization.............................................. 93
3.4 The Liberal-Capitalist Nature of Early American Occupation Policy .................. 99
3.5 The Morgenthau Plan: An Attempt at Policy Clarification.................................. 107
3.6 Directive J.C.S. 1067: The “Technical” Compromise ......................................... 114
3.7 The Yalta Shock: The Masked Incongruity of Allied Positions.......................... 119
3.8 Conclusion 125

CHAPTER 4: The Collapse of Dismantling as a Method ....................................... 127
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 127
4.2 The Revisionist Portrayal of Harry S. Truman ..................................................... 127
4.3 Truman’s Views Concerning the Soviet Union and Germany............................ 133
4.4 The Blanket Soviet Seizure of Reparations........................................................... 142
4.5 Reparations at Potsdam and Reactions to Soviet Moral Abandon ...................... 145
4.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 157

CHAPTER 5: The Early Stages of Industrial Demilitarization............................. 160
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 160 iv
5.2 The Contradictions of Demilitarization Policy ..................................................... 160
5.3 The Level of Industry Plan and Clay’s Reparations Stop ................................... 171
5.4 Paperclip, Safehaven and Hidden Reparations 186
5.5 An Imprecise Policy of Industrial Demilitarization in Action ............................. 192
5.6 Feeding Workers as a Structural Constraint.......................................................... 198
5.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 206

CHAPTER 6: The Militarization of Policy and Views of German Industry....... 207
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 207
6.2 The Joint Intelligence Committee and Washington’s Perceptions of Conflict... 208
6.3 The American “Shift” and the Impact on Demilitarization.................................. 214
6.4 Byrnes' Speech and the Official Change of Heart ............................................... 225
6.5 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 227

CHAPTER 7: The Marshall Plan and the End of Demilitarization...................... 230
7.1 Introduction 230
7.2 George C. Marshall and the Solidification of the New Course ........................... 232
7.3 The Truman Doctrine ............................................................................................. 240
7.4 The Moscow Foreign Minister's Conference of March 1947.............................. 244
7.5 The Harvard Speech, Marshall Plan and Soviet Rejection .................................. 252
7.6 Policy Revision: The Incongruity of Demilitarization with Recovery................ 258
7.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 262

CHAPTER 8: Explaining the German Productivity Boom.................................... 264
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 264
8.2 The Dismantling of Rheinmetall Borsig-Alkett and Intervention ....................... 265
8.3 The Joint Logistics Committee and Dual-Use Calculations ................................ 274
8.4 The Demilitarization-Marshall Plan Contradiction .............................................. 280
8.5 The Marshall Plan and Western German Industrial Recovery ............................ 287
8.6 Conclusion 294

CHAPTER 9: Military Radicalization ....................................................................... 296
9.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 296
9.2 The Berlin Blockade and Other Disasters ............................................................. 297
9.3 Perceptions of the Soviet Military and Stalin’s Plans for War ............................ 304
9.4 The Military Defense Assistance Program............................................................ 314
9.5 The Atlantic Military Alliance System and American Designs .......................... 324
9.6 The National Security Council Memorandum No. 68 and the German Role .... 329
9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 333

CHAPTER 10: Rearmament and Military Industrial Capacities......................... 335
10.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 335
10.2 Konrad Adenauer and the Issue of German National Security.......................... 336
10.3 The Korean War and the 1950s War Scare......................................................... 342
10.4 Domestic and Foreign Pressures against Visible Remilitarization.................... 347
10.5 The German Perspective on Dual-Use Matters .................................................. 353
10.6