”Deep Pockets” Collateral Assignments of Patents and the Growth of Innovations
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26
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English
Documents
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”Deep Pockets”, Collateral Assignments of Patents, and the Growth of Innovations Bruno Amable? Jean-Bernard Chatelain† Kirsten Ralf‡ February 14, 2005 Abstract This paper studies how imperfect collateral assignments of patents contribute to ”deep pockets” savings of innovative firms facing random investment oppor- tunities in Research and Development (R&D) and determine the growth of their innovations, using a version of the Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] model of credit cy- cles. Results are: patents as collateral leverages R&D finance and magnifies the e?ect of innovative rents on investment; the composition of current versus future financial constraints implies that firms savings decrease the steady state aggre- gate debt/patent ratio; the interaction between households and firms savings determine a leveraged growth of innovations which depends on the imperfection of collateral. Keywords: Collateral, Patents, Research and Development, Credit ra- tioning, Growth. ?University of Paris X and CEPREMAP, 48 Boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris France. E-mail: †LEO, University of Orleans. E-mail: ‡American University of Paris, 147 rue de Grenelle, 75007 Paris, ESLSCA and CEPREMAP. E-mail: .
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- innovation
- economy credit
- intermediate goods
- patent ratio
- households
- between households
- since innovation
- growth
- a?ect economic
- collateral
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